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MEASURING TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Cortelyou C. Kenney*
Over the past three and a half decades, hundreds of transnational human
rights civil suits—i.e., suits seeking monetary compensation for atrocities
committed abroad ranging from torture and extrajudicial killing to forced
labor and human trafficking—have been filed in the United States.
Exhaustive qualitative research chronicles plaintiff “successes” and
“failures” as defined by how frequently plaintiffs win, the magnitude of
judgments and settlements they obtain, and the extent to which judgments
and settlements are enforced. The prevailing wisdom is that while some
cases have proven runaway successes along these axes, in general,
transnational human rights suits constitute “a modest enterprise akin to
personal injury or mass tort suits.”1 Certain commentators argue that
hostility stemming from “foreignness” and reliance on international law is
responsible for this underwhelming performance and, in particular, the low
win rate in transnational suits.2 Commentators point to “avoidance
doctrines”—such as personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens,
abstention comity, and the presumption against extraterritoriality—
perceived as the most common means of shunting transnational cases as
evidence of courts’ “isolationism.”3 Other thinkers take the argument a
step further, claiming hostility toward international law portends the
demise of human rights in federal courts following the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 2013 decision Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel II)
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that fundamentally changed the landscape against which these suits are
litigated. But no scholar to date has undertaken a systematic, quantitative
examination of such conclusions to determine whether the numbers actually
bear them out.
This Article fills that gap. It collects a new dataset of all cases and
opinions filed from 1980 to the present under the two predominant human
rights civil statutes to scrutinize these claims and lay the groundwork for
future quantitative analysis. The data support three findings. First, the
transnational human rights enterprise is modest both in terms of how
frequently plaintiffs prevail and how much money they are entitled to and
actually do obtain, but not as modest as believed. Second, any modesty is
not evidence of courts’ isolationism. The real doctrines most commonly
employed to end civil suits prior to Kiobel II suggest that courts do not use
domestic law avoidance mechanisms designed to prevent consideration of,
and de facto shun, the application of international law. Rather, courts
apply international law, including human rights law, but are conservative
in their interpretation of it—protecting only certain types of harms
committed by certain types of actors. Third, a core group of claims has
weathered significant doctrinal shifts over time. Plaintiffs bringing these
claims are poised to circumvent Kiobel II and are on track to be as
“successful” or “unsuccessful” as ever.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past three and a half decades, hundreds of transnational human
rights civil suits—i.e., suits seeking monetary compensation for atrocities
committed abroad ranging from torture and extrajudicial killing to forced
labor and human trafficking—have been filed in the United States. Against
the backdrop of dictatorships and brutal military regimes in place during the
Cold War, human rights practitioners concluded that U.S. courts were the
best, or at least the least bad, fora to litigate such abuses because the
possibility of providing reparations to human rights victims was vanishingly
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small elsewhere. Prominent human rights lawyer turned law professor Beth
Stephens summed up the prevailing sentiment:
In a more perfect world, none of these human rights victims would have
chosen to file civil lawsuits in the United States. But the combined efforts
of international and domestic legal systems offer very little in the way of
enforcement or compensation to them or others like them around the
world. More importantly, civil litigation in their home countries and
criminal prosecution of those responsible are both clearly impossible.4

That the United States was better equipped to dispense this form of
justice was an assumption not unfounded. Human rights organizations led
the charge in the late 1970s and early 1980s, bringing civil suits in the
United States as part of a broader strategy to hold abusers accountable that
would eventually include pushing for criminal actions in countries such as
the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Belgium.5 In 1979, the first
successful transnational human rights case was filed under a little known
part of the U.S. Code called the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which entitles
aliens to civil damages for violations of the law of nations.6 The family of a
young Paraguayan who had been kidnapped, tortured, and killed by his
country’s dictatorship filed suit in the Eastern District of New York against

4. Beth Stephens, Taking Pride in International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 485, 486 (2001) (discussing the initial reasons advocates filed in the United States,
including both substantive and procedural advantages of the U.S. legal system over those of
foreign nations and the fact that the United States had become a haven for many human
rights abusers); see also Roxanna Altholz, Chronicle of a Death Foretold: The Future of
U.S. Human Rights Litigation Post-Kiobel, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2014) (explaining
that current victims seek justice in the United States given a relative lack of corruption);
Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil
Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 149 (2006) (arguing that the United States is a superior
forum for human rights victims because victims themselves can initiate individual cases
without the buy-in of the government as part of the public law system); Cortelyou Kenney,
Disaster in the Amazon: Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transnational Human Rights
Litigation, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 857, 861–62 n.23, 864 n.31 (2009) (collecting additional
sources in support of the continuing, though possibly mistaken, belief that the United States
is the strongest forum to litigate human rights claims).
5. Altholz, supra note 4, at 1498.
6. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878–80 (2d Cir. 1980). The ATS provides:
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)).
According to Professor Kenneth Randall, approximately twenty-one ATS cases were
filed between the statute’s enactment and the Filártiga decision, with courts twice finding
jurisdiction. Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims:
Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4 & n.15, 5 & n.16
(1985). Of the two cases where courts found jurisdiction, the first failed for lack of evidence
to support the violation, see Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961), and the second
was Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795), in which the court sustained
jurisdiction for the ATS but held that a treaty with France altered the outcome of the case, id.
at 811. There are still other decisions not cited by Professor Randall in which courts found
that there was jurisdiction but dismissed the case for other reasons. E.g., O’Reilly De
Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 50–51 (1908) (dismissing claim for cattle slaughter because
defendant was a U.S. actor whose actions were ratified by the U.S. government conferring
immunity from suit under the ATS).
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the officer allegedly responsible for these acts, then living in Brooklyn.7
The family had first pressed criminal charges in Paraguay, but the
Paraguayan police issued a death threat to their lawyer.8 In Filártiga v.
Peña-Irala,9 the Second Circuit held that the ATS gave U.S. district courts
jurisdiction to remedy violations of the law of nations committed abroad
against foreign nationals by officials acting “under color of government
authority.”10 After Filártiga, the ATS became the most important method
of bringing human rights civil suits in the United States and, arguably, the
world.11
Much ink has been spilt on the “successes” and “failures” of plaintiffs in
cases brought under the ATS and other similar statutes, such as the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 199112 (TVPA). In many senses these cases have
been successful: most scholars and practitioners agree that these laws are
symbolically and psychologically important because they validate victims’
experiences even when no money damages are awarded.13 They also point
to judgments and settlements ranging from the tens of millions to the
billions of dollars obtained in ATS and TVPA cases dealing with torture,
forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and massacres perpetrated by
dictators and their agents. Examples include judgments against Indonesian,
Guatemalan, Salvadoran, Argentine, and Chilean generals, the Philippine
dictator Ferdinand Marcos, the Haitian dictator Prosper Avril, an Ethiopian
official, and the former mayor of Beijing.14 Plaintiffs also increasingly

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878–80.
Id. at 879.
630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 881, 890.
Compare HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 33–35 (2008) (arguing that human rights advocates became warriors in the name of
violations abroad as civil rights lawyers did in the name of ending segregation and other
racially biased policies), with Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in
Non-U.S. Courts: A Comparative Scorecard, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 127, 136 (2013)
(contrasting ATS litigation with similar litigation in other locations, such as the United
Kingdom).
12. The TVPA is an amendment to the ATS that allows suits to be brought not only by
aliens but also by U.S. citizens against individuals acting under color of law who commit
torture or extrajudicial killing. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012)).
As of June 2014, there were just shy of 4500 law review articles that mentioned the
Alien Tort Statute. Altholz, supra note 4, at 1500 n.21.
13. BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS
xvii–xviii (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that even filing suits is often satisfying to plaintiffs where
defendants are forced to leave the United States or answer for atrocities and that such actions
can promote awareness of human rights abuses). Professor Koh enumerates five “successes”
of transnational suits: “compensation of victims; denial of safe haven to the defendant in the
judgment-rendering forum; deterrence of others who might contemplate similar conduct; and
enunciation of legal norms opposing the conduct for which the defendant has been found
liable.” KOH, supra note 11, at 25–26 (emphasis omitted). Professor Koh lists an additional,
final objective: “revision of illegal government policies.” Id. at 26. But see Beth Stephens,
The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2014)
(characterizing ATS cases as having “modest practical import”).
14. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 13, at 13–14 (collecting cases).
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bring transnational human rights civil suits against corporations.15 While
no court has upheld a jury verdict against a corporate defendant, expensive
settlements combined with even more expensive attorneys’ fees exert
pressure on defendants to modify their behavior to avoid payouts or the
potential publicity nightmare that might ensue.16
Yet even the most ardent supporters of transnational human rights suits
concede that “the direct economic benefit to individual plaintiffs has been
limited[] [and] [f]ew ATS plaintiffs have received monetary compensation
from their perpetrators.”17 One prominent human rights litigator turned law
professor has noted that, in terms of financial payouts, ATS litigation may
be seen as a “modest enterprise, akin to personal injury or mass tort
suits”18—a somewhat pessimistic outlook given that many of the most
important mass tort cases have “failed, at times in spectacular fashion.”19
But all agree that pursuing such claims is a long and arduous path, often
resulting in decades’ worth of litigation, hundreds of thousands, if not
millions, of dollars in attorney labor, or in dismissal or failure to enforce
judgments awarded.20 For example, the trial court awarded the Filártiga
family nearly $10.4 million in damages based on Paraguayan, U.S., and
international law.21 The judgment was never collected.22
Certain scholars attribute this lack of success—both in terms of verdicts
rendered and in terms of damages and settlements awarded and collected—
to the “foreignness” of such lawsuits.23 One thinker dubs the phenomenon
“litigation isolationism” and concludes that domestic civil procedural
15. Goldhaber, supra note 11, at 128.
16. Id. at 128–29.
17. Altholz, supra note 4, at 1500 & n.24, 1501 & n.25 (collecting scholarly commentary
in support of this proposition).
18. Van Schaack, supra note 1, at 2317. Professor Beth Van Schaack also observes that
ATS advocates seek to “produce lasting and systematic changes in countries where human
rights violations occur” and that the private bar later began to bring such suits and sought
attorneys’ fees. Id. at 2517; see also Stephens, supra note 13, at 1467 (noting the “modest”
impact of ATS suits).
19. David Marcus, Some Realism About Mass Torts, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1949, 1950 &
n.4 (2008) (explaining the difficulty of obtaining successful mass tort judgments).
20. KOH, supra note 11, at 40 n.88.
21. Id. at 34, 35 n.18.
22. Id. One problem, among many, that advocates have faced is uncovering where
assets are located if defendants hide them in offshore bank accounts and in countries that do
not extend comity to U.S. judgments.
23. See Bookman, supra note 2, at 1081; see also Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping
Federal Law in Transnational Cases: The Brave New World of Transnational Litigation, 93
N.C. L. REV. 995, 998 (2015); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and
Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1084 (2010). Prior to conducting this
quantitative study, I held a similar belief, writing that:
[While the] number of human rights lawsuits filed in the United States against
multinational corporate entities has skyrocketed . . . U.S. courts have displayed a
marked reluctance to hear such cases, in part due to the heavy administrative
burden they impose—for example, resulting from the challenges of managing
foreign plaintiffs and witnesses, translation requirements, and extensive
documentation—and in part due to the complex and unfamiliar questions of
transnational and international law they raise.
Kenney, supra note 4, at 861–62.
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“avoidance doctrines” such as personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens,
abstention comity, and the presumption against extraterritoriality that she
believes are used to dismiss transnational cases in favor of defendants “all
speak to the nexus between the United States, the parties, and a given
suit.”24 Other academics and practitioners argue that the surge in
conservative scholarship and Department of State’s position on the ATS
under George W. Bush “mirror debates about international law” that have
become volatile as corporate defendants and U.S. officials are increasingly
the targets of these suits.25 And still other commentators take the argument
a step further and contend that a recent Supreme Court decision, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.26 (Kiobel II), embodies growing hostility
toward transnational human rights suits and portends their imminent demise
in federal courts.27
Although qualitative, and some limited or unpublished empirical,
research supports the conclusions above, no scholar to date has undertaken
a systematic, quantitative examination to determine whether the numbers
actually bear them out.28 Such a study is important not solely as a
descriptive tool, but also as a predictive one. How did major decisions—
24. Bookman, supra note 2, at 1084 & n.18. Bookman defines “abstention comity” as
the power to abstain based on international comity concerns. She also lists “the act of
state . . . , standing, and the limited enforcement of non-self-executing treaties” doctrines as
“transnational litigation avoidance doctrines.” Id.; see also id. at 1084 n.17. This Article
does not address potential critiques of Bookman’s characterization of these doctrines, such
as the argument that personal jurisdiction is constitutionally rooted in access to due process.
25. See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 13, at 1468.
26. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
27. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation: The Road Not Taken, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1577 (2014) (suggesting that because the ATS is based on international law,
the presumption of extraterritoriality may limit the application of the statute in the future).
Many scholars believe other avenues for relief exist. See infra note 33.
28. Certain human rights resource centers and advocates used to or do keep informal
lists of past and pending ATS cases. See Susan Simpson, Alien Tort Statute Cases Resulting
in Plaintiff Victories, VIEW FROM LL2, http://viewfromll2.com/2009/11/11/alien-tort-statutecases-resulting-in-plaintiff-victories/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) (keeping a running list of
all ATS cases that “have resulted in something other than complete failure for the plaintiffs
who have brought the claims”) [http://perma.cc/BF6K-UM3S]. Some scholars, such as
Professor Stephens, have purported to possess data related to all ATS suits. See, e.g., Beth
Stephens, Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable Views of the Bush Administration, 33
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 773, app. at 810–12 (2008) (stating that 185 cases were filed between
Filártiga and 2008, and providing a brief summary of findings, but no dataset and no indepth analysis of the cases). Finally, attorney Jonathan Drimmer, in collaboration with
Professor Michael Goldhaber, has gathered perhaps the most extensive collection of data.
The Appendix to Professor Goldhaber’s article lists past and pending cases against corporate
defendants, the year and jurisdiction where the case was filed, and the disposition, if any.
Goldhaber, supra note 11, at 137–49. Very rarely, the Appendix summarily lists the grounds
for dismissal. See, e.g., id. at 139. Recently, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce released a
study of lower court cases post-Kiobel II. JOHN B. BELLINGER III & R. REEVES ANDERSON,
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, AS KIOBEL TURNS TWO: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
IS LEAVING THE DETAILS TO LOWER COURTS (2015), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.
com/uploads/sites/1/Kiobel_v6.pdf [http://perma.cc/CN3N-S47S]. While as a preliminary
matter the authors do not release the raw data and do not explain their methodology, they
also appear not to account for newly filed cases not on Westlaw. Finally, certain claims are
erroneous, as can be seen from the data I make publicly available with this Article.
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especially at the circuit and Supreme Court levels—change the strategies
adopted by transnational human rights advocates, and how might these
strategies change again in the wake of the most recent ripples in
transnational human rights litigation? Using suits under the ATS and
TVPA as proxies for transnational human rights claims more generally,29
this Article fills the gap and lays the groundwork for future quantitative
analysis. I gather a new dataset of approximately one thousand opinions
that reference these statutes. Using this dataset, I analyze the “successes”
and “failures” narrowly defined by the win rate for human rights plaintiffs
in nonfrivolous, non pro se suits; the magnitude of damages awarded and
settlements obtained in these cases; and whether these judgments and
settlements are enforced where such data are publicly available.30 I
examine trends in these “successes” and “failures” over time, the doctrines
most commonly used to terminate such suits, and how these doctrines have
changed, among other observations. After analyzing the data, I offer some
thoughts on the future of the trends illustrated.
Part I presents the methodology used to collect and analyze data
surrounding these suits. While some datasets partially collect cases
litigated under the ATS or TVPA,31 they often represent fragments of ATS
and TVPA suits based on the window of time the author has examined and,
for the most part, do not trace these cases beyond the appellate or Supreme
Court decisions included in Westlaw or Lexis. This Article is the first to
analyze not only all relevant cases since 1980 but also over seven hundred
dispositive and nondispositive opinions produced along the way. (Although
I tabulate approximately three hundred additional irrelevant, pro se, and
frivolous cases, this Article does not analyze them.) It also is the first to
trace cases through their entire lifecycles, including, for example, voluntary
dismissals and quashed motions to enforce judgments. Finally, it is the first
to break the cases down based on the components listed above and many
others, providing additional information for future scholars to mine.
Part II discusses two general findings. First, the transnational human
rights enterprise is—mostly—modest from a monetary perspective. Courts
tend to dismiss roughly 65 to 80 percent of these cases at the pleading stage,
and only a handful of cases have led to default judgments or jury verdicts
for the plaintiffs. While the size of judgments has been enormous, almost
none have been collected in full. Further, while most ATS settlements
eclipse their civil rights counterparts, only 7 percent of human rights cases
settle. Nevertheless, the enterprise becomes more lucrative than originally
thought as the magnitude and number of judgments and settlements

29. I employ them as proxies because they represent the overwhelming majority of such
claims.
30. To the extent that ATS suits have had symbolic value for victims or have enabled or
catalyzed policy changes abroad, these outcomes would most certainly count as “successful”
and, indeed, likely more so than simple monetary awards. Nevertheless, such results would
be extremely difficult to analyze from a quantitative perspective and are not the focus of this
Article, which solely examines “success” from a financial perspective.
31. See supra note 28.
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increases over time and creative shifts in human rights suits post-Kiobel II
emerge.
Second, the data show that the freestanding grounds typically thought to
terminate these suits are different from those imagined. Courts rarely rely
on domestic civil procedure “avoidance doctrines” that allegedly show U.S.
courts not only fail to engage international law, but have an affirmative
allergy to it. The primary grounds courts employ to shunt such suits
illustrate courts are willing to engage international law qua international
law—they are simply conservative in defining human rights doctrines. In
rejecting most plaintiffs’ claims, courts actively grapple with what harms
are prohibited by the law of nations32 and how severe the harms must be to
be protected under international law. Courts also look to the identity of the
defendants and examine applicable immunity doctrines—including
sovereign immunity, head-of-state immunity, diplomatic immunity, and the
like—that are staples of international law.
Part III introduces the third major finding. It analyzes cases over five
discrete periods bookended by major doctrinal changes. It demonstrates
that early suits were framed differently than later suits and that the types of
successful suits mutated over time, perhaps due to Supreme Court decisions
and important decisions from certain courts of appeals. For example, the
particular causes of action and forms of pleading used by plaintiffs, the
types of defendants against which suits were filed, and plaintiffs’ responses
to certain defenses changed over each of these periods. At the same time,
plaintiffs have been able to weather intra-doctrinal shifts, and a core group
of claims has remained actionable throughout the entire thirty-five year
window. Even when bringing some of these claims became more difficult
as doctrines narrowed, the success rate was, and remains, fairly constant.
After analyzing the data, this Article concludes by suggesting that
transnational human rights suits are not dead—even if brought against
corporations or other private parties not acting “under color of law.”
Plaintiffs may have a substantially more difficult time post-Kiobel II, but
with careful pleading, case, and party selection, they may still be able to
carry the day, just as they have always adapted to new doctrinal wrinkles.
Other creative means of bringing such suits under different human rights
statutes or other causes of action may also arise.33 In sum, we should not
32. This phrase was core to the Supreme Court’s second encounter with the Alien Tort
Statute, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machaín, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), but lower courts grappled with its
contours for many years before and after it. As such, I use it as shorthand for what some
scholars refer to as the “Sosa defense” because the data illustrate that the defense arose long
before Sosa.
33. See generally Roger P. Alford, Human Rights After Kiobel: Choice of Law and the
Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 1089 (2014) (advocating the
application of foreign law to human rights claims); Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens,
International Human Rights Cases Under State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 9 (2013) (suggesting that what would have been ATS claims will be pursued as claims
under state law).
Nevertheless, claims under state and foreign law against foreign defendants are now
subject to another decision that arguably limits their scope. In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the
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pronounce the death of transnational human rights suits and should
certainly not conclude that courts have shut their doors toward international
law even as they narrowly interpret it.
I. METHODOLOGY
This Article approaches the successes and failures of transnational human
rights through an empirical lens. I gathered all known ATS and TVPA
opinions in federal court since 1980 through a search in Westlaw for case
citations to the sections of the U.S. Code where the statutes are codified.34 I
then parsed the approximately one thousand opinions down by reading the
cases and eliminating those where the statutes were merely discussed or
mentioned and keeping those where the statute or statutes were relied upon
as a cause or causes of action or basis for federal jurisdiction. I further
eliminated frivolous lawsuits defined in reference to a court’s own
characterization of the claim, or suits where the plaintiff was pro se,35 or, in
cases under the ATS, where the plaintiff was not an alien. I also treated
multidistrict litigation as distinct cases if the cases had individual docket
numbers; I listed them once if all docket numbers were the same (i.e., not
double counted). Finally, I coded opinions in a single case based on which
opinion was outcome determinative: I marked nondispositive opinions36 as
“relevant” (R), and I marked final adjudications as “yes” (Y) if the case had
Supreme Court in another 9-0 decision confronted a personal jurisdiction case where the
plaintiffs brought claims under California and Argentine law for wrongful death as well as
under the ATS and the TVPA for torture and forced disappearances. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
During oral argument, counsel for the plaintiffs conceded that it would be an “uphill
struggle” to win the ATS claims, but stated they could pursue claims under California’s
long-arm statute. Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11965). The Court ruled that finding general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
simply because its U.S. subsidiary transacted business in a state violates the Due Process
Clause “given the absence of any [state] connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or victims
described in the complaint.” Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 751.
34. Some scholars have criticized the use of Westlaw to gather random samples of data
related to issues such as dismissal rates. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal
Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1209 n.24, 1215 &
nn.44–45 (2013). Whether these complaints apply to a dataset of all cases is unclear.
Professor David Engstrom suggests that dismissal rates may appear lower if data from
PACER are taken into account because judges are much less likely to write a published
opinion should the motion be denied. Cf. id. at 1209 n.24. However, we know ATS cases
rarely make it to the summary judgment stage because if such motions are denied, the cases
may result in trial, and ATS commentators have paid close attention to the trials that have
been held. Contrarily, if summary judgment motions are granted, then the case generally
results in a published opinion. But see Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The Electronic
Availability of Summary Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 107, 130
(conducting a study of eight district courts and noting that only 40 percent of summary
judgment opinions are available on an electronic database). The data take account of all
settlements. Thus the only other outcome is that a case dies after surviving a motion to
dismiss, which is likely a fairly rare occurrence.
35. All fully resolved pro se cases that relied on the ATS were dismissed. Some pro se
cases are still pending.
36. I counted dispositive opinions with respect to the determination of the ATS and
TVPA claims. For example, if the court dismissed all ATS and TVPA claims from a suit,
this opinion would be dispositive even if other causes of action were allowed to proceed.

1062

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

been resolved or “ongoing litigation” (OL) if the case is still pending.37
Cases that are deemed irrelevant because they discuss, but do not rely on,
the ATS as a cause of action were marked “no” (N). Pro se (PS) and
frivolous (FL) were notated as well.
I next broke down each of the remaining seven hundred opinions by the
year resolved or issued; the jurisdiction in which it was brought; the
particular cause or causes of action it relied on; the type of defendant
against which it was brought (i.e., individual, official, state, agency,
corporation, or other entity); the disposition of the case (i.e., a victory for
the defendant(s) or plaintiff(s) or a settlement); the stage of the case at
which it was resolved (i.e., a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary
judgment, a jury trial, a default judgment, etc.); the ground on which the
case was resolved (including multiple grounds); the basic facts of the case;
the causes of action alleged; any major aspects of the opinion or opinions in
the case, including important dicta; if the case resolved in favor of the
plaintiff(s), what damages were awarded, if any; and, if damages were
awarded, whether the judgment was enforced, taking into account appeals
and collateral challenges to the judgments. In addition, I determined which
cases settled and, based on any publicly available information such as news
articles, the amount of the settlement if such information was available.
The settled cases are marked “SET” in the disposition column.
Unlike the limited existing datasets, after first identifying the cases
through a Westlaw search, I followed up by examining each case’s docket
sheet on Bloomberg Law. This step was crucial to identify, for example,
the outcome of a case that had been remanded after an appeal or dismissed
on a motion to dismiss with leave to amend or where a default judgment
was collaterally challenged upon collection efforts—aspects of a case that
go to its ultimate economic “success.” In a few instances, I supplemented
the data on Westlaw and Bloomberg with data derived from other sources.
The supplemental data comprise only a tiny fraction of the overall dataset.
Finally, I collected cases filed post-Kiobel II through a search in Bloomberg
of the section of the U.S. Code in which the ATS and TVPA are codified.
Although I collected data related to all ATS and TVPA cases filed from
1980 through the present, I also broke them down by time period based on
events likely to have influenced the manner in which such cases were
litigated or treated by the courts. The first period I examine in this Article
is 1980 to 1992, i.e., starting with the year Filártiga came down and ending
with the year the TVPA went into effect. Soon after Filártiga, the D.C.
Circuit, in a 1-1-1 split in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,38 dismissed a
case alleging that the Libyan government, the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), and other groups seized two Israeli buses as well as a

37. I counted cases as ongoing where motions to dismiss were granted, the court granted
leave to file an amended complaint, and the amended complaint is pending. These cases are
marked as “OL” in the dataset. Additionally, cases where an appeal, a motion for
reconsideration, or a petition for certiorari are pending are counted as “OL.”
38. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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taxi, torturing and shooting their riders.39 The per curiam section gave no
reason for the dismissal; instead, Judge Bork’s concurrence, which
questioned the underlying nature of the ATS, became the widespread
argument against Filártiga.40 Judge Bork questioned the premise that the
ATS gives rise to a cause of action against defendants for violating the law
of nations, opined that the ATS was of a purely jurisdictional nature, and
reasoned that to construe it otherwise would render all U.S. treaties—past,
present, and future—self-executing, a premise rejected under black letter
law.41 He also argued that courts should not infer a cause of action under
customary international law.42
In 1991, partially in response to Tel-Oren and the growing number of
ATS suits, Congress enacted the TVPA. The TVPA provides a statutory
cause of action for victims of torture and summary execution regardless of
their citizenship against any official acting under color of law if the plaintiff
first exhausts local remedies and sues within ten years of the violation.43
Most commentators agree that the TVPA “affirmed the importance of the
[ATS] and indicated ‘it should not be replaced.’”44 Nevertheless, they note
that the TVPA did not significantly expand the scope of transnational
human rights cases beyond the citizenship aspect.45 The prevailing wisdom
is that most cases alleging these types of harm were filed under both
statutes and that the TVPA provided a fallback option in jurisdictions where
ATS victories were harder to achieve.
The next period I divide the data into is from 1992 to 1995, i.e., from the
year the TVPA went into effect until another well-known Second Circuit
decision, Kadic v. Karadžić.46 The defendant in Kadic was the head of an
insurgent group that de facto controlled parts of the unrecognized
Republika Srpska during the Bosnian War and that helped perpetrate the
genocide there.47 The court held that private actors such as the defendant
could also be held liable under the ATS even if not acting under color of
law—but only for certain violations of the law of nations.48 The prevailing
wisdom is that, after Kadic, suits that were previously thought untenable—

39. Id. at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring); id. at 798 (Bork, J., concurring).
40. See Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law and Private Rights of Action, 1
CHI. J. INT’L L. 421, 427–29 (2000).
41. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810–20 (Bork, J., concurring).
42. Id. According to Professor Bradley’s reading of subsequent law, the Supreme Court
later agreed with the first argument, finding a presumption that treaties do not confer a
private right of action. CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM
207 n.43 (2013) (citing Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008)).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2 (2012). The TVPA also contains extensive and highly
specific definitions of torture and summary execution. Id. note § 3.
44. KOH, supra note 11, at 36 n.59 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102–367, at 1 (1991)).
45. Philip Mariani, Assessing the Proper Relationship Between the Alien Tort Statute
and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1392 n.50, 1428–29 (2008)
(citing S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3–5 (1991)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3–4 (1992),
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86.
46. 707 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
47. Id. at 232.
48. Id. at 239. The Court did not extend its holding to the TVPA. Id.
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i.e., those against private actors, including corporations—began to be filed
in relatively large numbers.49 Indeed, immediately after Kadic, the first
case alleging jurisdiction against a corporation for a noncommercial tort
was filed: Doe I v. Unocal Corp.50 The case involved a multinational oil
giant acting in Myanmar.51 The plaintiffs argued that the company and its
partners knew that the country’s military “use[d] violence and intimidation
to relocate whole villages, enslave farmers[,] . . . and steal . . . property for
the benefit of [the oil] pipeline.”52 According to the plaintiffs, this conduct
caused “the [villagers] to suffer death of family members, assault, rape and
other torture, forced labor, and the loss of their homes and property, in
violation of state law, federal law, and customary international law.”53
The third time period is 1996 to 2004, from Kadic through a Supreme
Court decision following up on some of the issues raised in Filártiga.
Filártiga had not defined the “law of nations,” though it did specify that the
phrase’s meaning must be determined by present-day international norms,
not international norms as they stood at the passage of the first Judiciary
Act.54 In 2004—after more than two decades of debate in the lower federal
courts as to the precise contours of what sorts of transnational human rights
suits were actionable—the Supreme Court finally weighed in with Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machaín.55 The plaintiff, Humberto Alvarez-Machaín, was a
Mexican doctor who allegedly had participated in the torture and killing of
a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent by prolonging his
life during torture sessions.56 After the Mexican government refused to
extradite Alvarez-Machaín, stating he would be prosecuted in Mexico,57 the

49. See Sandra Coliver et al., Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable by Using
International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary Strategies, 19
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 169, 208 (2005).
50. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., No 2:96-cv-06959 (C.D. Cal Oct. 3, 1996). Wiwa v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 1:296-cv-08386 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1996), was filed one
month later.
51. Doe I v. Unocal Corp. (Unocal I), 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, Doe I v. Unocal Corp. (Unocal II), 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), appeal
dismissed per stipulation en banc, Doe I v. Unocal Corp. (Unocal III), 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir.
2005). I refer to the country as Myanmar rather than Burma because the court of appeals
referred to it as such. I do not wish to imply any political stance through such use.
52. Id. Prior to Unocal I, other cases advanced the theory that corporations could be
held liable for violations of the law of nations—to no avail. For example, in Canadian
Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compañía de Acero Del Pacífico S.A., a dispute arose over whether a
Chilean company was a “foreign entity” under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
and thus whether the court had jurisdiction over it. 528 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d,
727 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1984). The court held it could not exercise jurisdiction and, in
passing, stated that the plaintiff’s reliance on the ATS was also insufficient to obtain
jurisdiction over the defendant because “commercial violations . . . do not constitute
violations of international law.” Id. at 1347 (citing Verlinder B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 325 n.16 (2d Cir. 1981)).
53. Unocal I, 963 F. Supp. at 883.
54. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
55. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
56. Id. at 697.
57. United States v. Alvarez-Machaín, 504 U.S. 655, 670–71 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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DEA hired Mexican nationals to kidnap him and bring him to the United
States, where he was detained and tried.58 The trial court acquitted
Alvarez-Machaín, and he sued Sosa, one of the men who abducted him, as
well as other Mexican citizens, DEA agents, and the United States itself
under the ATS.59 The district court dismissed the U.S. defendants but
awarded Alvarez-Machaín $25,000.60 The Ninth Circuit affirmed in a
panel decision and on en banc review, holding that the ATS accepted a
“clear and universally recognized norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest and
detention.”61 In Sosa, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit,
proclaiming: “[T]here are good reasons for a restrained conception of the
discretion a federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of
action of this kind.”62 The Court elaborated that while the tort must be a
violation of the present-day law of nations, such law must be “accepted by
the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th-century paradigms” such as piracy, violations of safe conduct,
and offenses against ambassadors.63 The Court then ruled that AlvarezMachaín’s claim did not pass this test because he had been detained for
“less than a day,” was then transferred to the “custody [of] lawful
authorities,” and had a “prompt arraignment.”64 Commentators debate
whether Sosa raised the bar set by Filártiga—cabining or expanding the
claims considered violations of the law of nations.65
The fourth major time period is 2004 to 2013, from the year when the
Supreme Court decided Sosa up until another pathmaking Supreme Court
decision on the ATS. On April 17, 2013, the Supreme Court issued a
unanimous opinion in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.66 (Kiobel II).
The plaintiffs alleged that the oil company and its partners “enlisted the
Nigerian Government to violently suppress [] burgeoning demonstrations”
against the “environmental effects” of the consortium’s operations and
accused the companies of “aiding and abetting” the Nigerian military and
police forces, which killed, beat, raped, and arrested the protestors.67
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts held that because the
plaintiffs, the defendants, and the alleged violations of the law of nations
were outside the United States, the case did not “touch and concern” the
United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
58. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 699.
61. Id. (quoting Alvarez-Machaín v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 620 (9th Cir. 2003)).
62. Id. at 725.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 738.
65. See Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machaín: “The Door Is Still Ajar” for Human
Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 533–34 (2005) (predicting that Sosa
would not affect the success of ATS suits); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt
Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machaín and the Future of International Human Rights
Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2293 (2004) (arguing Sosa was a boon,
not a bust, for ATS plaintiffs).
66. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co (Kiobel II), 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).
67. Id. at 1662–63.
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extraterritoriality embedded in all statutes.68 The presumption embodies
the principle that U.S. law applies within the territorial boundaries of the
United States “but does not rule the world.”69 The presumption is displaced
if a statute provides a “clear indication of an extraterritorial application,”70
such as the provision giving U.S. courts jurisdiction over genocide, no
matter where committed, if the “alleged offender is, among other things,
‘present in the United States.’”71 The Court explained the principle behind
the presumption: to “protect against unintended clashes between our laws
and those of other nations which could result in international discord.”72
Neither the text nor the history of the ATS indicated that jurisdiction should
attach on the facts there given their lack of nexus to the United States.73
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence to emphasize that “[o]ther
cases may arise [under the law of nations] . . . covered neither by the TVPA
nor by the reasoning and holding of today’s case” that may warrant
additional “elaboration and explanation.”74 Justice Breyer, who wrote for
Justices Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concurred in the judgment.
Justice Breyer argued that jurisdiction under the ATS should attach, under
certain circumstances, even to events that occurred abroad—for example,
where the defendant is a U.S. national.75 Nevertheless, even Justice Breyer
argued that jurisdiction should be “consistent with those notions of comity
that lead each nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations by
limiting the reach of its own laws and their enforcement.”76 In this case, he
agreed with the majority that there was an insufficient nexus because mere
corporate presence in the form of a NYSE listing or public relations office
does not suffice for jurisdiction.77 Justice Alito, writing for himself and
Justice Thomas, concurred.78 He argued that suits under the ATS are only
viable if the conduct is exclusively within the United States.79

68. Id. at 1669.
69. Id. at 1664 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010);
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)).
70. Id. at 1664.
71. Id. at 1665 (citing and quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
72. Id. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
73. See id. at 1669.
74. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and Kagan
concurred in the judgment, arguing instead for a disjunctive test finding jurisdiction where
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American
national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an
important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in
preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as
criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.
Id. at 1670–71 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
75. See id. at 1671.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1670–71.
78. Id. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 1669–70.
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The last period is Kiobel II onward, i.e., 2013 to 2015.80 Although not
much time has passed since Kiobel II, many cases have been resolved in its
wake. This Article captures the outcomes and important opinions since
then. It does not run statistical regression analyses to predict the future of
such cases because there are not enough data to accurately do so and, even
if there were, the sheer number of variables and the inability to capture
behavioral changes affected by such variables make the task virtually
impossible. Instead, this Article offers informed speculation as to the future
of transnational human rights suits. The rest of my findings are based on
tabulation. Any inferences drawn regarding the factors that influence them
are again based on informed guesswork.
II. GENERAL FINDINGS
Based on the dataset and a narrow metric of “success” defined in
reference to the frequency of plaintiff wins, the amount of monetary awards
and settlements reached, and whether these awards and settlements were
enforced, this Article concludes that the consensus that ATS and TVPA
suits are a modest enterprise is mostly correct.81 In reaching this
determination, I examine a variety of factors: dismissal rates at the motion
to dismiss stage; settlement rates and amounts; and default judgments and
trials.82 The data show that the majority of suits are dismissed at the
pleading stage, an aberration from other areas of law where motions to
dismiss are only filed in a tiny fraction of federal cases, including those
with gruesome fact patterns resembling ATS and TVPA cases.83 It is also
correct that the settlement rate for ATS and TVPA cases is low relative to
civil rights suits, and therefore the economic gains of these settlements are
blunted.84 Nevertheless, the total magnitude of known settlement amounts
increased over time as well, with the exception of the latest (and shortest)
period in which there have been, by definition, fewer opportunities for
settlements to arise.85 The magnitude of ATS and TVPA judgments and
settlements is also higher as a general matter than civil rights cases, even if
they are unenforceable or at least have not been enforced up through the
present.86 Thus, the ATS and TVPA are perhaps more economically viable
than typically thought.87

80. The data are current through November 12, 2015, when this Article was sent to
press.
81. See infra Part II.A–C.
82. See infra Part II.A–C.
83. See infra Part II.A.
84. See infra Part II.B.
85. See infra Part II.B.
86. Judgments obtained under the ATS that have not yet been enforced are not
necessarily permanently unenforceable. If plaintiffs are able to uncover hidden assets, the
likelihood of receiving compensation increases if the nation or nations where the money is
located extend comity to U.S. judgments. But see infra Part II.C and accompanying notes
for a discussion of the litigation arising from the Marcos regime in Philippines.
87. See infra Part II.
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The data also suggest that conclusions drawn regarding hostility toward
international law or the foreignness of lawsuits are, at least in part,
misplaced. Courts are actually more likely to rule for plaintiffs than
defendants if the suit makes it to the merits. Of course, this may illustrate
the rigor to which cases of this nature are subject, but it also demonstrates
that courts are not closing their doors entirely, as might be expected if the
postulates advanced by litigation isolationists were true. Awards have also
increased over time, even while the percentage of default judgments has
fallen, also suggesting that judges and juries are sympathetic to plaintiff
claims and consider the level of injustice these cases present. Further, the
doctrines courts have predominantly used to dismiss ATS and TVPA suits
differ from those that certain prominent scholars believe are used to shunt
transnational cases.88 Almost no cases are dismissed on “abstention
doctrines,” such as comity or forum non conveniens, that such scholars
argue are based on adherence to the principle that courts should not
intervene in international affairs.89 The dismissal doctrines actually used
oscillate in relative importance based on the time period, but the two used
primarily throughout are failure to state a claim under the law of nations
and sovereign immunity—with the exception of the post-Kiobel II period
dominated by considerations of the presumption against extraterritoriality.90
These two doctrines do not reject international law because they only limit
the type of transnational suits that can be brought in U.S. courts based on
their severity and the type of actor involved, rather than rejecting these suits
wholesale.
This part is broken down into aspects that reveal the overall “success” of
ATS and TVPA suits and courts’ attitudes to these suits writ large.
A. Dismissal Rates
The most striking observation over the past thirty-five years is the high
overall dismissal rate of ATS and TVPA cases. In total, approximately 325
nonfrivolous, non pro se cases91 that rely on one or both statutes for their

88. See infra Part II.D.
89. See infra Table 1.
90. See infra Table 1.
91. Approximately 110 additional pro se cases were filed, mostly on the basis that the
plaintiff-prisoners were mistreated in violation of the Vienna Convention, for example by
not being advised of their Miranda rights in English, De Los Santos Mora v. Brady, No. 06Civ-46, 2007 WL 981605, at *1–2 (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2007) (dismissing a citizen of the
Dominican Republic’s complaint alleging that the officer advised him and another passenger
in the car of their Miranda rights, but as a Spanish speaker, he did not understand them), or
by being denied the opportunity to consult with their consulates after being arrested,
Keszthelyi v. Bowman, No. 1:06-Civ-187, 2007 WL 626221, at *3–4 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 23,
2007) (dismissing a South African national’s claim based on the alleged failure to advise
him, after arresting him, of his right (under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention) to contact
the South African consulate).
This number also excludes cases in which the plaintiff or plaintiffs is or are not
aliens, cases that Professor Stephens included when she tabulated how many ATS cases had
been resolved between 1980 and 1997. See Stephens, supra note 13, at 1447, 1448 & n.117.
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causes of action were resolved from 1980 to 2015,92 with twenty-seven
suits still pending.93 Out of the approximately 325 cases that were
resolved, approximately 220 were dismissed at the pleading stage94 (around
68 percent), with only thirty-one of these approximately 220 (around 14
percent) dismissed without prejudice. This is a shocking inversion of the
role played by motions to dismiss in most cases even after Bell Atlantic
Corporation v. Twombly95 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal96 (together, “Twiqbal”),
which, at least according to some studies, increased dismissal rates at the
pleading stage.97 Indeed, post-Twiqbal motions to dismiss are only filed in
approximately 6 percent of all federal civil cases.98 In § 1983 cases, which
are often considered the least successful domestic civil rights cases and
which often share many fact patterns with ATS and TVPA cases (e.g.,
physical abuse), motions to dismiss are filed approximately 12 percent of
the time.99 Of the motions to dismiss in all cases as of 2010, 75 percent

92. These suits may include additional causes of action typically arising from the AntiTerrorism Act (ATA), Trafficking Victim Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA),
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), or domestic tort laws, and
if plaintiffs prevail, the win may turn on these other causes of action. Nevertheless, the ATS
and TVPA are significant enough claims to merit separate discussion by the deciding court if
these claims are dismissed or still pending when a settlement is reached. See, e.g., Javier H.
v. Garcia-Botello, 239 F.R.D. 342 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting leave to amend RICO
complaint by adding ATS claims). The case partially settled on May 24, 2013, with ATS
claims still pending. Javier H. v. Garcia-Botello, No. 1:02-cv-00523, slip op. at 1–4
(W.D.N.Y. May 24, 2013).
93. See supra note 37 for the definition of “pending.” Of the pending cases, nine have
been dismissed and are awaiting the outcome of an appeal, a decision on an amended
complaint, or an additional dispositive action.
94. This figure does not disaggregate 12(b)(6) motions from 12(b)(1) and 12(c) motions,
but that is because courts themselves often do not do so in this context. For example, if the
defendant argues that the alleged acts do not amount to a violation of the law of nations, and
a court finds such an argument persuasive, the court could either find that the complaint fails
to state a claim because the facts alleged do not rise to a recognized violation of the law of
nations (such as forced labor) or find that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the
complaint because forced labor is not a violation of the law of nations. In reaching the
former conclusion, a court would generally assume for the sake of argument that forced
labor could violate the law of nations but did not under these specific factual conditions,
effectively blurring the distinction among the three motions.
95. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
96. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
97. Compare JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/17889/download
(conducting an empirical study using the CM/ECF filing system to show that new pleading
standards do not affect dismissal rates) [http://perma.cc/234L-MJDY], with Engstrom, supra
note 34, at 1234 (estimating an overall Twiqbal effect of approximately 11 percent).
Importantly, Professor Engstrom notes that post-Twiqbal, parties to lawsuits themselves have
demonstrated a selection bias that accounts for much of the effect. Engstrom, supra note 34,
at 1219 n.54, 1223 n.66. That is to say, post-Twiqbal not only did some greater percentage
of courts dismiss claims, but also plaintiffs may have filed fewer or different claims,
defendants may have filed more motions to dismiss, and settlement dynamics may have
changed. Id. at 1223–24.
98. CECIL ET AL., supra note 97, at 8.
99. Id. at 8–9.
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were granted in whole or in part.100 But of these 75 percent, 35 percent
were granted with leave to amend.101 In civil rights cases, 78 percent of
motions to dismiss were fully or partially granted, but 33 percent of these
dismissals included leave to amend.102 As such, not only do ATS and
TVPA suits have a likelihood of dismissal that is an order of magnitude
higher than these cases, but courts also frequently conclude that plaintiffs
could not allege additional facts that would change the outcome and
therefore dismiss with prejudice.103
As shown in Figure 1, the volume of resolved cases increased
dramatically over time, with the exception of the 1992 to 1995 and 2013 to
present periods—which is to be expected given the narrower time window.
Figure 1

Number of Resolved Cases by Year
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100. Id. at 13.
101. Id. at 14.
102. Id. at 8.
103. That such motions were so easily granted in ATS and TVPA cases of course has
huge ramifications not only for the possibility of obtaining relief for the plaintiffs, but also
for exposing the wrongs perpetrated through discovery. While limited jurisdictional
discovery is granted in some cases, this is a rarity. As such, the symbolism and “soft”
success of these cases are also called into question.
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Nevertheless, despite the increase in caseloads from 2004 to 2013, the
dismissal rate remained within a 15 percent range for all periods.104
Dismissals slightly increased over time, with the exception of the 1980 to
1992 period.105 Many cases have been dismissed post-Kiobel II—indeed,
more than in the 1995 to 2004 period in absolute terms. Yet, the dismissal
rate for the most recent post-Kiobel II period is actually on par with other
periods as demonstrated by Figure 2.
Figure 2

Dismissal Rates by Year
Percent of Resolved Cases
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70%
64% 64%
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67%

62%
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1995-2004
With Prejudice

2004-2013

2013-2015

Without Prejudice

Note: All cases classified as split motions to dismiss with and without prejudice are counted
as with prejudice.

104. See infra Figure 2.
105. One prominent scholar has suggested that corporate lawsuits are weaker if brought
by private sector lawyers who possess less familiarity with the statute and make weaker
factual allegations and that the entrance of major law firms as defense counsel in the wake of
corporate lawsuits resulted in doctrinal changes that made it more difficult for plaintiffs to
prevail. See Email from Beth Van Schaack, Visiting Professor in Human Rights 2014–2015,
Stanford Law Sch., Professor of Law, Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Mar. 31
2015, 16:35 PST) (on file with the author). This Article does not examine such factors in
depth, which would require tabulation of the types of organizations representing the
plaintiffs. It does, however, examine the success rate of corporate lawsuits and the evolution
of dismissal grounds over time, which may partially shed light on this postulate.
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The high dismissal rate does support the proposition that transnational
human rights suits have modest economic outcomes as the vast majority of
them result in no payout whatsoever. Of course, it would be difficult if not
impossible to account for all variables that explain why courts have
dismissed suits at these rates over the past thirty-five years. This exercise is
particularly difficult without going into the precise nature of the claims
brought, including not simply the causes of action alleged, but also the
factual allegations made in support of them. Nevertheless, the postulate
that courts are increasingly hostile toward these claims because of their
foreignness seems unlikely given the relative stability in this dismissal
rate.106 Or else, if courts have become increasingly hostile toward these
cases, plaintiffs have been able to circumvent this increased hostility
through the types of claims they bring, the manner in which they couch
these claims, and the manner in which they respond to defenses—the three
factors most likely to be relevant at the pleading stage. Indeed, as Part III
shows, the types of claims alleged varied as the periods evolved, with
higher dismissal rates for harms of a lesser magnitude than torture,
genocide, and extrajudicial killings—some core claims that remained
actionable throughout.
B. Settlement
A single-digit percentage of ATS and TVPA cases settle, yet the few
settlements reached are often in the tens of millions of dollars, as illustrated
by Figure 3. This suggests that the transnational human-rights enterprise is
indeed modest, but perhaps only mostly so. Out of the 325 cases brought
by ATS and TVPA plaintiffs, only twenty-three (approximately 7 percent)
had settled as of this Article’s publication.107 It is hard to tell how large
many of these settlements are, because they are, for the most part,
confidential. Nevertheless, known settlements generally eclipse those in the
domestic civil rights arena with the possible exception of class action
employment discrimination lawsuits.108 The largest known corporate
settlement under the ATS was over Swiss banks that secretly retained the
deposits of Jewish customers killed during the Holocaust.109 The case
106. Of course, this combination likely rules out docket clogging as well. That courts are
not dismissing these cases at a higher rate at an earlier stage, even when the claims spiked
and when the complexity of these cases was at its peak, suggests courts are not merely
throwing out these cases because they take up more space.
107. For purposes of this Article, if a case settled after a motion to dismiss with leave to
amend, it was not counted as a dismissal but rather as a settlement. As such, the dataset does
not reflect the lifecycle of a case with perfect verisimilitude. For counting purposes, this
Article excludes certain settlements, though they are included in the dataset. See infra notes
110, 113. This Article also excludes probable or possible settlements where, for example,
the parties voluntarily dismissed claims after a favorable ruling for the plaintiff(s).
108. See Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform,
49 B.C. L. REV. 367, 368–69 (2008) (collecting cases from the 1990s and 2000s resulting in
payouts ranging from $54 to $190 million against major corporate defendants for
employment discrimination).
109. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 141–42 (E.D.N.Y.
2000).
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settled in 1998 for a record-breaking $1.25 billion and “was followed by
actions by World War II slave laborers, which were settled for more than $5
billion” and “additional claims arising out of the Holocaust and other World
War II atrocities, the Armenian genocide, and U.S. slavery, among
others.”110 The largest civil rights settlement in U.S. history for the
Department of Agriculture’s alleged systematic racial discrimination in
awarding financial assistance after the promise of “an acre and a mule” was
initially valued at approximately $2.25 billion, but only $1 billion was ever
collected.111 The case, which dates from the Clinton Administration, has
inspired follow-up litigation that in turn settled for $1.1 billion.112 Of
course, the Holocaust and slavery reparations suits are outliers in the ATS
and civil rights arenas, respectively. Nevertheless, other ATS settlements
still managed to clock in around the tens of millions mark. For example,
the next largest agreement after the Holocaust litigation,113 Doe I. v. Unocal
Corp.,114 allegedly settled for $30 million.115 The lowest settlement

110. Id.; STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 13, at 543. There are good reasons to discount
these settlements, as Professor Goldhaber does, Goldhaber, supra note 11, at 129 n.12, given
the diplomatic pressure exerted by the U.S. government to obtain them, see, e.g., In re
Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 142, the fact that some, at least, were
settled pursuant to bilateral treaties (not the ATS or TVPA), and the fact that many were
based on causes of action generally not recognized under the ATS, such as expropriation of
property, see, e.g., Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(describing a suit for the expropriation of assets by descendants of Jewish customers of
French banks); Cases and Representative Matters, CARLIN LAW OFFICES, http://www.carlin
lawoffices.com/cases.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) (explaining that the case settled for
$300 million) [http://perma.cc/S4YL-UK9X]. For the purposes of this Article, I similarly do
not include them.
111. Kelly Toledano, Making Good on Broken Promises: How the Pigford Settlement
Has Given African-American Farmers a Second Chance, 5 S. REGION BLACK L. STUDENTS
ASS’N L.J. 68, 80–81 (2011).
112. Kindaka Jamal Sanders, Re-Assembling Osiris: Rule 23, the Black Farmers Case,
and Reparations, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 339, 341 (2013) (describing the Claims Resolution
Act of 2010 that created a $1.1 billion fund to finance the In re Black Farmers
Discrimination Litigation settlement).
113. For counting purposes, this Article excludes the $75 million settlement reached after
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the
Nigerian plaintiffs’ allegations against Pfizer that the drug company tested a drug for
meningitis without their informed consent because the settlement was premised on a
concomitant suit brought by the government of Nigeria and the state of Kano against Pfizer
in Nigerian courts. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01-Civ-8118, 2005 WL 1870811, at *188
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005) (dismissing case for multiple reasons, including that testing without
informed consent did not violate the law of nations), rev’d and remanded, 562 F.3d 163, 187
(2d Cir. 2009) (holding that medical experimentation under these circumstances violated the
law of nations and instructing the district court to evaluate forum non conveniens factors).
See also Pfizer Lawsuit (re Nigeria), BUS. & HUMAN RTS. RESOURCE CTR., http://businesshumanrights.org/en/pfizer-lawsuit-re-nigeria#c9346 (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://
perma.cc/JG5D-T8F7].
114. 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), appeal dismissed per stipulation en banc, 403 F.3d
708 (9th Cir. 2005).
115. Goldhaber, supra note 11, at 129.
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involved an Iraqi security contractor, which provided $100,000 per
deceased plaintiff and $20,000 to $30,000 per injured plaintiff.116
The settlement rates and amounts varied significantly. The greatest
absolute number of settlements occurred in the 2004 to 2013 period, with
twelve cases settling. The absolute payouts of these settlements (excluding
the Holocaust settlements) dwarfed prior periods.
Figure 3

Known Settlement Amounts by Year
($ in millions)

$ 49

$ -

$ -

1980-1992
n=0

$6

$6

1992-1995
n=1

$ 10

$9
$ -

1995-2004
n=1
Total

$ -

2004-2013
n=5

$ -

2013-2015
n=0

Average

The fact that these settlements occurred seems to be proof that courts are
not hostile against corporate claims.
Courts universally denied
corporations’ motions to dismiss in cases prior to these settlements,
assuming—and in some case explicitly deciding—that corporations could
be held liable under international law.117
C. Trials and Default Judgments
Interestingly, although the odds are against a plaintiff at the pleading
stage, if he or she survives a motion to dismiss, he or she has a decent
chance of winning on the merits, again suggesting the suits are potentially

116. In re XE Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2009) (dismissing a
complaint against businesses and an owner for killing or seriously injuring Iraqi citizens
while providing security to U.S. nationals; this case was settled privately).
117. Only one decision ever indicated otherwise, and it was not premised on hostility
toward international law, but rather on a conservative interpretation of it. See Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel I), 621 F.3d 111, 118, 120 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d on other
grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); see also infra Part III.D. Prior to Kiobel I, the Second
Circuit itself assumed corporations could be liable in nine different cases. See In re S.
African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 254 n.125 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (collecting cases).
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less modest than advertised.118 Out of the 325 cases resolved, fifty-six (17
percent) made it to the merits.119 In these cases, plaintiffs prevailed
approximately 63 percent of the time. And often when the defendants
prevailed—for example, when default judgments were denied sua sponte—
these rulings were based on technical grounds, like sovereign immunity,
rather than whether the defendant had actually committed the violations.
This contrasts with the figures from civil rights cases, in which plaintiffs
lose because insufficient evidence supports their claims.
There are too few trials to meaningfully assess success rates over time.
Interestingly, however, the number of default judgments is higher than the
number of trials, and therefore some observations can be made. (The
percentage—though not the absolute number—of default judgments
decreased over time.120)
Figure 4

Default Judgments by Year
Percent of Resolved Cases

27%

15%

1980-1992
n=5

1992-1995
n=3

7%

7%

1995-2004
n=4

2004-2013
n=11

5%

2013-2015
n=3

It is possible that this trend evinces judicial hostility toward human rights
claims in U.S. courts, as at least some courts examined on their own
initiative whether such cases should be dismissed without an appearance
from the defendant. More likely, though, the trend results from the fact that
cases were increasingly brought against corporations, which are far more

118. Only seven were decided at the summary judgment stage. Other cases were decided
at a variety of different stages such as a voluntary dismissal. Because there are many cases
with miscellaneous procedural postures, this Article does not detail them all, although the
dataset does.
119. For purposes of this Article, cases that make it to the merits involved a trial or
default judgment, either granted or denied or some other equivalent determination. This
excludes cases decided on summary judgment, cases that settled, cases that were voluntarily
dismissed after surviving a motion to dismiss, and other equivalent determinations.
120. See infra Figure 4.
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likely to appear than individual defendants located outside of the United
States. Indeed, of the approximately 325 cases, at least 127 (38 percent)
had a corporate defendant, and no case between Filártiga and Kadic had
corporate defendants.121 Of the three judgments against corporations—of
which two were default judgments and the third a jury trial122—one was
reversed on appeal,123 and in another the plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew
after the defendant later appeared to challenge enforcement.124 As such, the
decrease in default judgments—which includes the 1995 to 2004 period
when the doctrinal conditions were arguably the most favorable for these
cases—is probably due to the defendants actually appearing.125 And of the
two nonfrivolous default judgments that were denied, one was based on
doctrines that, as explained in Part II.D, do not reflect a belief that the case
lacks a sufficient nexus to the United States or litigation isolationism.126
Nevertheless, despite the percentage decrease in awards that suggests
these suits are not as successful as they used to be, the number of cases in
which damages were awarded increased over time, as did the magnitude of
these awards.127

121. Some cases had corporate plaintiffs. See infra Part III.
122. See Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, No. 1:08-cv-01659, slip op. at 1–2
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2009) (reporting trial verdict awarded to torture victim detained by
Bangladeshi police at the behest of his employer after he refused to turn over his stake in the
company); Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., No. 1:06-cv-22128, slip op. at 1–2 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 7, 2013) (awarding judgment of $80 million against the defendant, a shipping company
involved in human trafficking with the government of Cuba); Aguilar v. Imperial Nurseries,
No. 3:07-Civ-193, 2008 WL 2572250, at *1–2 (D. Conn. May 28, 2008) (granting default
judgment in an H-2 visa human trafficking case).
123. Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, 746 F.3d 42, 54–55 (2d Cir. 2014)
(overturning jury verdict).
124. Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., No. 1:06-cv-22128, slip op. at 1–2 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
17, 2015) (granting voluntary dismissal).
125. Many individual defendants are located outside of the United States. In contrast,
most corporations have an office in the United States to receive service of process.
126. See Chen v. China Cent. Television, 320 Fed. App’x 71 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing
sua sponte a claim against a Chinese television station because the station was an
instrumentality of the state under the FSIA); Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1306 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (dismissing a claim on a motion of United States against local Chinese officials
for abusing Falun Gong practitioners on the basis that the suit violated the act of state
doctrine). But see Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran, 961 F. Supp. 2d 185,
205 (D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing action based on border attacks between Israel and Lebanon,
alleging that banks and others were involved in transfers of funds from the Islamic Republic
of Iran to the terrorist group that carried out the attacks based on the presumption against
extraterritoriality).
127. See supra Figures 3, 4; infra Figures 5, 6.
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Figure 5

Number of Cases with Awarded Damages by Year
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Figure 6

Judgment Amounts by Year
($ in millions)
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The judgments, like the settlements, dwarf judgments in domestic areas
of law, including civil rights and intentional torts. Ultimately, almost none
of these judgments have been collected because the defendants fled the
country after they were sued, did not possess assets in the United States, or
failed to appear.128 Nevertheless, most judgments are in the hundreds or

128. But see supra note 86.
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tens of millions of dollars, with a handful in the billions, as illustrated by
Figure 6. For example, when the former dictator of the Philippines and his
daughter were sued for the massacre of ten thousand citizens, the court
awarded $1.2 billion in punitive damages and $766 million in compensatory
damages.129 As of the date of this Article, the plaintiffs were still
attempting to collect the judgment after a court in the Philippines ruled that
the money belonged to its government.130 Similarly, in a case against the
head of a nonstate organization responsible for the genocide in Rwanda, a
district court awarded two groups of plaintiffs large sums of money: $745
million and $4.5 billion, respectively.131 None of the money was ever
collected.132
D. Dismissal Grounds
The grounds on which ATS and TVPA cases have been dismissed are not
those predicted by some ATS commentators and do not reflect a hostility
toward or an unwillingness to engage international law qua international
law—at least pre-Kiobel II.133 Rather, they suggest that courts have a
relatively conservative interpretation of what international law norms mean
and whether they apply to a given fact pattern.
Scholars such as Pamela Bookman discuss so-called transnational
avoidance doctrines that enable courts to shunt cases on domestic law civil
procedure doctrines before ever reaching questions of international law or
foreign relations, which is properly the domain of the executive.134
Bookman takes courts “at their word” in determining judicial attitudes
toward transnational suits, coining the phrase “litigation isolationism” to
explain that U.S. courts are reluctant to take on suits that she argues have
very little to do with the United States.135 Among other examples of
129. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1996).
130. Vince Alvic & Alexis F. Nonato, Victims of Human Rights Violations Under
Marcoses Ask Makati Court to Comply with Hawaii Judgment, BUS. WORLD, July 2, 2015, at
S1.
131. Kadic v. Karadžić, No. 93-cv-1163 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2000) (awarding $745
million to women who were raped during the Bosnian War); Doe I v. Karadžić, No. 93-cv878 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000) (awarding $4.5 billion to victims of rape, torture, and
genocide during the Bosnian War).
132. Rachel Irwin, Civil Actions Offer Some Closure for Bosnia Victims, INST. FOR WAR
& PEACE REPORTING (Apr. 26, 2011), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/civil-actions-offer-someclosure-bosnia-victims [http://perma.cc/4FYV-A348].
133. In part this may simply be due to the qualitative nature of the existing scholarship.
Scholarly intuitions—including some of my own—are disproven by the data, which show a
more nuanced landscape of dismissal doctrines. See supra note 23 (collecting scholarship).
134. See, e.g., Bookman, supra note 2, at 1084 & n.17, 1085 (collecting sources); see also
supra note 23 (collecting scholarship).
135. Bookman, supra note 2, at 1085, 1089. Although Bookman’s piece is about
transnational suits generally, transnational human rights and claims feature “perhaps most
controversially” in her article. Id. at 1084. Bookman also makes no attempt to quantify how
many cases she claims belong to each category within the broad umbrella of transnational
suits. She lists, for example, suits against “U.S. manufacturers alleging that their airplanes
crashed overseas due to propellers malfunctioning[,] . . . [suits] alleging that foreign-owned
companies plotted securities fraud in the United States[,] . . . [and suits] alleging that foreign
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transnational human rights litigation dismissed on the grounds of being “too
foreign,” Bookman highlights a now-notorious ATS suit brought against
Chevron (formerly Texaco) for dumping eighteen billion gallons of toxic
waste into the Amazon Rainforest.136 The case was dismissed to Ecuador
by Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York because it had
“everything to do with Ecuador and nothing to do with the United
States.”137 Bookman identifies the most important transnational avoidance
doctrines she believes are used to eliminate cases like these as personal
jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, extraterritoriality, and “abstention
comity.”138
She
also
lists
“the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality, . . . forum selection clauses, comity, and the political
question,” as well as “the act of state doctrine, standing, and the limited
enforcement of treaties that are not self-executing” doctrines.139 Professor
Stephens takes a similar tack.
Although in an earlier piece she
acknowledges that immunity doctrines and failure to state a claim under the
law of nations led to many dismissals,140 in her seminal treatise, she isolates
“political question, act of state, comity, ‘case-specific’ deference to the U.S.
executive branch, and the foreign affairs doctrine” as some of the most
important dismissal grounds.141 At core, these latter doctrines are not
merely instrumental means of terminating suits; they reflect judicial
attitudes toward the ATS, and debates over the ATS “offer a unique
window into the modern history of international law.”142
But the above doctrines are not, in fact, the primary means for dismissing
transnational human rights suits—at least not pre-Kiobel II. As can be seen

firms exported dangerous products to the United States that caused injury there” as other
categories. Id. Given the hundreds of cases in the ATS and TVPA category, it is safe to
assume they represent a large quantity of these cases.
136. Bookman, supra note 2, at 1100.
137. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d,
303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002). I have engaged in advocacy work with the Ecuadorian
plaintiffs in this case. Any views expressed are my own. For a more thorough discussion of
the suit, see Kenney, supra note 4.
138. Bookman, supra note 2, at 1096 (quoting Maxwell Commc’ns Corp. v. Societe
Generale, 93 F.3d 1036, 1047 (2d Cir. 2009)); see also id. at 1096 & n.94 (collecting cases).
139. Bookman, supra note 2, at 1084 n.17 (citations omitted).
140. Stephens, supra note 28, at 777.
141. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 13, at 337. Stephens unequivocally states that
immunity doctrines were featured heavily in recent years and that these reflect a
conservative interpretation of international law. Stephens, supra note 13, at 1524.
Nevertheless, Professor Stephens contends that these doctrines were not a principle means of
dismissing ATS and TVPA suits before the George W. Bush Administration “because courts
had little difficulty holding that the acts at issue . . . were not official acts and, therefore, that
government officials were not entitled to immunity”—a statement that underestimates the
importance of the immunity doctrines prior to the arrival of President George W. Bush. Id.
Stephens’s position on the political question doctrine is also somewhat muddy. On the one
hand, she explicitly lists it in her treatise as one of the arguments proffered in favor of
dismissing transnational suits on the basis that foreign policy is the province of the
executive. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 13, at 337. On the other hand, she states that courts
have almost universally rejected the political question doctrine as a means of dismissing
ATS suits. Id. at 338–39.
142. Stephens, supra note 13, at 1467–70.

1080

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

in Table 1, the most commonly used methods of dismissing ATS cases are
failure to state a claim under the law of nations and immunity doctrines, in
particular sovereign immunity.143 As Part III discusses in greater detail, in
dismissing a case for failure to state a claim under the law of nations, courts
actively engage international law.144 They grapple with what types of
harms are protected under the principle of customary international law—
where norms against the behavior in question are so strong as to create an
international consensus that they are illegal—and whether the harms as
alleged are severe enough to violate these norms. And, as Part III discusses
in detail, immunity doctrines also are components of international law that
reflect the principle that governments, sitting heads of state, and diplomats
are sometimes exempt from civil jurisdiction in U.S. courts—and the
domestic courts of most foreign countries—out of respect for reciprocity
and communication in the international community.145 Without such
protections, the thinking goes, the international community would be unable
to freely function because each nation’s officials would constantly be sued
by other countries for offenses they committed.146 Of course, there are
exceptions to such doctrines under international law, such as jus cogens,
which provides certain norms cannot be derogated under any
circumstances,147 an argument that certain courts have adopted and that
illustrates they do not uniformly engage in what Bookman labels
“abstention comity.”148 Indeed, figuring out the precise boundaries of these
immunities, and under what circumstances they attach, is the bread and
butter of international law, and it requires courts to understand and engage
international law principles, not shun them due to suits’ foreignness.
The above doctrines remained the two most prevalent means of
dismissing these cases and were used approximately 35 percent and 27
percent of the time, respectively, over the entire time span analyzed. They
remained prominent even during periods scholars might not expect them to
be. For example, even after a 1989 Supreme Court decision held that the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act149 (FSIA) rendered sovereign states
immune from suit unless the state met one of the statutorily codified

143. Professor Stephens also asserts that suits brought under the ATS by non-aliens
represent a statistically significant number of cases dismissed. See id. at 1448 & n.117. This
dataset indicates that non-aliens only bring a fraction of cases. A far more statistically
significant ground that Professor Stephens does not note are cases brought by pro se litigants
who do not allege facts that support the causes of action they advance. Cases of this ilk—
marked as “IPC” and “PS” in the dataset—are far more predominant.
144. See, e.g., infra Part III.
145. See, e.g., infra Part III; see also Dapo Akande & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State
Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 818
(2011).
146. Akande & Shah, supra note 145, at 818.
147. Jus Cogens, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
148. See infra Part III.D.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (2012).
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exceptions,150 courts continued to invoke the doctrine of sovereign
immunity against states and their instrumentalities.
As to the numerous doctrines Bookman and Professor Stephens invoke,
combined they make up far fewer grounds of dismissal. Pre-Kiobel II, they
represented an even smaller amount of all dismissals. Indeed, of all 220
cases dismissed, only six were dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens—seven if counting Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce,
N.A.151 twice. (After the courts of Guatemala refused to hear the case due
to a “blocking statute,”152 the plaintiffs attempted to return it to the forum
that dismissed it to no avail.153) Similarly, only thirteen fully resolved
cases were decided on the basis of raising a nonjudiciable political question,
and most of these were decided on other grounds as well.154 As to personal
jurisdiction, most of these twenty dismissals were based on inadequate
service of process rather than lack of contacts to the forum that would
indicate “isolationism” or a refusal to apply international law.

150. See generally Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428
(1989). See, e.g., de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 671 (D.D.C. 1980)
(“[A] foreign state is not entitled to immunity from an action seeking money damages ‘for
personal injury or death . . . caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state’ or its
officials or employees.”).
Note that this position does not reflect attempts to hold individuals liable as
described in Part III.D.
151. 741 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2014); 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2008).
152. See M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How Convenient Is
Forum Non Conveniens in Transnational Litigation?, 4 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 21,
27 (2007) (discussing “blocking statutes” employed by countries depriving their courts of
jurisdiction to hear cases dismissed on a forum non conveniens basis from the United States
or elsewhere).
153. Aldana, 741 F.3d at 1352.
154. A court in the Eastern District of Virginia recently dismissed an additional case on
political question grounds, but that decision is being appealed. See infra note 367.
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1992-1995

1980-1992

Table 1: Dismissal Grounds by Year

Grounds of Dismissal

Number

Percent of
Resolved(1)

Law of Nations

12

46%

Immunity Doctrines(2)

9

35%

Nonjusticiable Political Question

3

12%

Other Grounds

7

27%

Immunity Doctrines(2)

5

71%

Law of Nations

2

29%

Notes:
(1) Percent reflects all occurrences of grounds of dismissal per resolved case.
(2) Includes all immunity doctrines, including sovereign immunity, head-of-state immunity, diplomatic
immunity, et cetera.
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2004-2013

1995-2004

Table 1 continued

Grounds of Dismissal

Number

Percent of
Resolved(1)

Law of Nations

11

29%

Immunity Doctrines(2)

7

18%

Statute of Limitations

6

16%

Personal Jurisdiction

3

8%

No Private Right of Action

2

5%

Nonjusticiable Political Question

2

5%

Forum Non Coveniens

1

3%

Other Grounds

8

21%

Law of Nations

41

37%

Immunity Doctrines(2)

27

25%

Personal Jurisdiction

11

10%

Insufficiently Pled Complaint

8

7%

Nonjusticiable Political Question

6

5%

No Grounds Given

6

5%

Not Natural Person

5

5%

Other Grounds

28

25%

Notes:
(1) Percent reflects all occurrences of grounds of dismissal per resolved case.
(2) Includes all immunity doctrines, including sovereign immunity, head-of-state immunity, diplomatic
immunity, et cetera.
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2013-2015

Table 1 continued

Grounds of Dismissal

Number

Percent of
Resolved(1)

Presumption Against Extraterritoriality

16

38%

Immunity Doctrines(2)

11

26%

Law of Nations

6

14%

Personal Jurisdiction

6

14%

Other Grounds

20

48%

Notes:
(1) Percent reflects all occurrences of grounds of dismissal per resolved case.
(2) Includes all immunity doctrines, including sovereign immunity, head-of-state immunity, diplomatic
immunity, et cetera.

Finally, for many years there was widespread handwringing over whether
the ATS was purely jurisdictional such that it did not create a cause of
action, and cases such as Tel-Oren reflected this trend.155 Some scholars,
especially Professors Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, argued that
the ATS could not support suits for violations of the law of nations because
only the political branches can incorporate customary international law into
domestic law.156 As Sosa established, the ATS is jurisdictional, but the
cause of action is found in federal common law that incorporates customary
international law.157 And no empirical evidence supports the proposition
that any significant number of non pro se cases, pre-Sosa, were dismissed
because the ATS does not confer a private right of action, though several
cases were dismissed because they relied on non self-executing treaties as
evidence of the law of nations.158 The only cases in the dataset falling into
this category do so either because they rely on a non self-executing treaty

155. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 13, at 27.
156. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law As
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 833–34
(1997).
157. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machaín, 542 U.S. 692, 719, 724 (2004).
158. Only one non pro se case in the dataset was dismissed on the basis that the ATS did
not create a cause of action pre-Sosa, but even this case did not explicitly rely on the ATS as
a cause of action. See White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1382, 1387 (E.D. Wash. 1998)
(dismissing suit brought against prison physician, alleging in part that plaintiffs were
subjected to nonconsensual medical experimentation while in custody in violation of
international law’s prohibition of crimes against humanity).
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that was not well established enough to form a norm under customary
international law or because plaintiffs attempted to invoke norms that were
not sufficiently definite or universal.
III. FINDINGS AND TRENDS OVER EACH TIME PERIOD
This part details the evolution of transnational human rights claims under
the ATS and TVPA over time, summarizing the success rates and major
doctrinal shifts over each period.
The data support three major takeaways. First, while the dismissal rate
remained within the same 15 percent band, major doctrinal shifts occurred
over time, such as the emergence of the presumption against
extraterritoriality and the doctrine that corporations are not persons under
international law. Second, the data illustrate not only that new dismissal
grounds emerged, but also that shifts often occurred intra-doctrinally. In
other words, judicial interpretations of the law of nations, sovereign
immunity, and other existing dismissal grounds evolved, though
occasionally in contradictory directions. Sometimes lower courts refused to
follow the Supreme Court, and sometimes the Supreme Court actually
proved helpful to plaintiffs when lower courts accepted new arguments
against these cases. For example, even as lower courts ratcheted up the
immunity afforded government officials, the Supreme Court checked that
tendency. And even as the Supreme Court imposed the new territoriality
requirement, at least some lower courts were quick to interpret it narrowly.
Third, while the dismissal rates remained relatively constant, the data
establish that plaintiffs increasingly diversified the identity of defendants,
as suits moved from suits against individuals to suits against state
instrumentalities to suits against private entities and corporations, which
expanded the scope of ATS and TVPA liability.
While it is impossible to prove causality based on the dataset, these facts
suggest that attempts to expand ATS and TVPA liability were not entirely
successful. On the other hand, these facts suggest that plaintiffs’ lawyers
were able to circumvent the evolution and doctrinal shifts that occurred
during some of these periods, including both post-Sosa and post-Kiobel II,
by bringing cases that stood up to these shifts, or through effective
pleading, or both.
A. From Filártiga to the TVPA
The early period of the ATS—largely considered the “honeymoon” phase
by scholars159—was actually one in which plaintiffs experienced the lowest
success rates.160 One potential explanation is that courts were hostile
159. Stephens, supra note 13, at 1469.
160. Until the passage of the TVPA in 1991, at least thirty-three nonfrivolous, non pro se
ATS suits were fully resolved apart from Filártiga, and thirteen more were filed. Of these
cases, only four were resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. Three cases have unknown end
results, but the last recorded opinion in two of these indicates the ATS claims would likely
have been dismissed. The remaining twenty-six cases were dismissed before even reaching
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toward international law. Yet, the low success rate may be better explained
by a judicial struggle to develop a workable definition of the law of nations,
as well as a conservative interpretation of which actors could be sued. In
the few cases where plaintiffs did prevail, they alleged harms similar to
those in Filártiga, namely torture and extrajudicial killings, and sued state
officials, forming the hallmarks of actionable ATS and TVPA claims today.
The biggest mark against the ATS and manifestation of hostility toward
international law qua international law was Tel-Oren, which as noted was a
suit against the PLO and other entities for the torture and death of many
Israelis.161 The per curiam section gave no reason for the decision.162
However, Judge Bork argued in his concurrence that the ATS did not itself
create a cause of action for violations of the law of nations.163 He based
this conclusion on the logic underlying the act of state doctrine164 and the
political question doctrine (derived from the former in the context of
international law).165 According to Judge Bork, while the act of state
doctrine had originally been premised on “comity” and respect for the
“sovereignty” of sister nations, it evolved into a separation of powers
doctrine premised on a recognition that the judiciary has no institutional
competence to intervene in foreign affairs, deemed within the province of
the executive.166 Congress or the President could have affirmatively
authorized a private cause of action in a treaty or other agreement for
plaintiffs to pursue under the ATS but did not.167 To conclude otherwise
would interfere with the executive’s design in enacting treaties or otherwise
acceding to international law.168 Judge Robb based his concurrence
entirely on the political question doctrine, arguing that there were no
judicial standards through which to assess the case nor was it the
prerogative of the courts to intervene in matters of foreign affairs in which
neither Congress nor the executive provided guidance for statutory
construction.169

the summary judgment stage, meaning at minimum courts terminated approximately 79
percent of all cases resolved during this period at the pleading stage. This is the highest rate
of any of the five periods with the exception of post-Kiobel II. And during this time, the
judgments favoring plaintiffs and the one settlement were relatively minor compared to what
they would later amount to in dollar value. The highest dollar value amounted to
approximately $60 million, none of which was ever collected.
161. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
162. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
163. Id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 789 (Edwards, J., concurring) (“Where the Act of State Doctrine applies, the
Supreme Court has directed the courts not to inquire into the validity of the public acts of a
recognized foreign sovereign committed within its own territory . . . . The doctrine does not
require courts to decline jurisdiction, as does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, but
only not to reach the merits of certain issues.” (internal citation omitted)).
165. Id. at 800.
166. Id. at 802.
167. Id. at 814–19.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
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Although Tel-Oren prompted massive scholarly commentary, it was an
island doctrinally speaking. No other case during this time period struck
down ATS claims on Judge Bork’s logic or, for that matter, Judge Robb’s,
however compelling they may have been to scholars or officials in the
Reagan Administration. The real hostility toward ATS cases was likely a
result of their novelty. Judges and parties had rarely grappled with the
statute before and, as such, knew very little about what to do with it.
Historically it had only been applied to a narrow array of cases, for
example, those related to ambassadors.170 After Filártiga, both individual
victims of human rights abuses and corporations contended that defendants
violated their rights under the law of nations. Because many of these fact
patterns, as well as the categories of the parties who brought them or were
sued under them, differed in kind from Filártiga, courts were left without
much guidance on a number of questions.
Filártiga did not define what constituted the law of nations, except to say
that it “may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing
professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations;
or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.”171 In applying
this methodology, courts adopted a narrow definition of the phrase,
rejecting claims based on torts such as negligence,172 conversion,173
expropriation of property,174 and fraud,175 even when the facts suggested
potential human rights violations such as failure to protect from political
violence or confiscation of property during a dictatorship. Other claims that
courts deemed not to violate the law of nations included abuses of free
speech176 and environmental law treaties.177 At least one court ruled that

170. See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 492–93, 492 n.143,
494 n.152 (1986).
171. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820)).
172. See, e.g., Jones v. Petty Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 343, 348
(S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding plaintiff’s complaint that Sudan was negligent in failing to warn
the plaintiff’s family of “imminent political danger and violence and failing to provide
adequate police protection and security” did not state a claim under the law of nations and
that the plaintiff failed to allege alien status).
173. See, e.g., Cohen v. Hartman, 634 F.2d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
Canadian citizen who alleged his employee converted his funds did not state a claim under
the law of nations).
174. See, e.g., Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(dismissing Iranian nationals’ suit against the government of Iran to recover money for
allegedly wrongful expropriation of their property on the grounds that Iran’s actions did not
violate any U.S. treaty, and the law of nations does not prohibit a government’s
expropriation of the property of its own nationals).
175. See, e.g., Trans-Continental Inv. Corp. v. Bank of Commonwealth, 500 F. Supp.
565, 570 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (holding that allegations by a foreign company against Michigan
bank and its controlling persons for fraud was not a violation of the law of nations).
176. See, e.g., Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 278, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (holding
that seizure of Philippine citizens’ film did not rise to the level of a violation of a universally
recognized right, but also that the act of state doctrine immunized the government from suit).
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while causing “disappearances” during a military dictatorship was a
violation of the law of nations, “cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment”
during the same was not, despite the corpus of treaty law surrounding the
issue.178 And Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren found the allegations that the
PLO tortured and killed Israelis similar to those of Filártiga and therefore
theoretically actionable, but distinguished the case on the ground that
nonstate entities could not be held liable for torture under international law,
otherwise the crimes simply amounted to assault.179 Judge Edwards also
argued that politically motivated terrorism, “no matter how repugnant it
might be,” was not a violation of the law of nations given the lack of
consensus in the international community condemning it.180
There were many other cases where violations of the law of nations
might have been established, and yet claims were still dismissed. The
second most important means of dismissing early ATS cases was sovereign
immunity, a doctrine that was not deployed against officials themselves, but
against states. Nine cases were dismissed based on sovereign immunity,
with three suits against the U.S. government181 and two more against its
agents.182 The underlying rationale for these dismissals was that the United
States cannot be sued unless it consents to such a suit and that the ATS does

177. See, e.g., Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding plaintiffs’ suit for shipment of contaminated copper did not rise to a violation of the
law of nations because the defendant had violated no treaty).
178. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding claims for
“cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment” did not amount to violations of the law of nations
because the tort was not universally “definable,” i.e., it could encompass many different
types of treatment). This Article counts Forti as a “success” because the second amended
complaint resulted in a default judgment for the plaintiff. Id. Nevertheless, the opinion
illustrates the narrow definition of the Law of Nations some courts crafted after Filártiga.
179. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.29 774, 791–95 (D.C. Cir. 1914)
(Edwards, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 795–96.
181. Industria Panificadora, S.A. v. United States, 957 F.2d 886, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(dismissing suit by Panamanian businesses for looting in the wake of invasion of Panama);
Lloyd’s Syndicate 609 v. United States, 917 F.2d 1552, 1553 (11th Cir. 1990) (dismissing
suit arising out of many laws, including the ATS, for aircraft that was destroyed during
fighting in Panama against the United States); Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States, 663
F.2d 1081, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dismissing suit under the ATS for refusal to permit a
vessel to enter a port on the ground of risk to national security).
182. Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990) (dismissing suit by Haitian
refugees detained after their entry for their unlawful detention and treatment received in a
detention center); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 204–05 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(dismissing suit brought against the U.S. President and other federal defendants alleging they
provided “financial, technical, and other support to anti-Nicaraguan terrorist groups” that
“carried out scores of attacks on upon innocent” civilians that “resulted in summary
execution, murder, abduction, torture, rape, wounding, and destruction of private property
and public facilities” on the grounds of sovereign immunity as well as the political question
doctrine (citation omitted)). The last case, Bennett v. Stephens, No. 88-Civ-2610, 1989 WL
17751 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 1989), which dealt with a woman who believed the government was
transmitting radio waves into her body, was nominally decided on the grounds of sovereign
immunity even though it could well be deemed frivolous. Id. at *4.
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not function as a waiver or as consent.183 Dismissal on this ground may
have, in large part, been due less to the importance of the immunity
accorded foreign countries than to a desire to protect our own government.
Later periods suggest this reasoning may be motivating this doctrinal
development because courts later held that U.S. officials could not be sued
though foreign officials could be. Of the cases against non-U.S. defendants,
all three were brought against foreign governments (the Soviet Union,184
Saudi Arabia,185 and Argentina186). The Supreme Court effectively ended
all litigation under the ATS against foreign states in Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.187 This decision held that jurisdiction over
foreign states must be predicated solely on the FSIA—a statute passed in
1976 that provides statutory immunity to foreign states unless one of the
exceptions applies (e.g., for commercial activities or for state torts
committed within the territory of the United States).188
Other individual grounds of dismissal during this time period include
individual cases dealing with inadequate service of process,189 the political
question doctrine,190 and standing.191 For these latter two grounds, the
183. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, “[a] foreign state shall not be immune
from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States . . . in which the foreign state has waived
its immunity either explicitly or by implication.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2012); see also
infra notes 188–91.
184. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 736 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1990)
(holding that a guardian of a Swedish diplomat’s suit against Soviet Union for the diplomat’s
unlawful seizure, subsequent imprisonment, and possible death was barred by sovereign
immunity).
185. Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, No. 88-Civ-1791, 1989 WL 435302, at *1, *4 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 11, 1989) (dismissing suit brought by systems engineer against Saudi Arabia for being
“shackled, tortured, and beaten” while he was detained by Saudi Arabia after making reports
of safety violations), rev’d on other grounds, Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1530
(11th Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 507 U.S. 349 (1993), vacated on other grounds,
996 F.2d 270 (11th Cir. 1993).
186. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 431 (1989)
(dismissing suit brought by Liberian corporation against Argentina for bombing its oil tanker
on the high seas during the Falklands War).
187. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
188. Id. at 431; 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a). Prior to Amerada Hess, one court had handed down
a default judgment against the Republic of Chile for a car bombing during the military
dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet that killed both the Chilean ambassador and foreign
minister to the United States while they were in Washington, D.C., en route to a meeting. de
Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that such
conduct constituted a violation of international law and that FSIA did not apply); Richard B.
Lillich, Damages for Gross Violations of International Human Rights Awarded by U.S.
Courts, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 207, 208 n.5 (1993) (reporting the damages were jointly assessed
by the Chilean-U.S. Commission at $5,062,854.97).
189. See, e.g., Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 115 (5th Cir. 1988)
(dismissing British national’s suit against various businesses under the ATS for his
imprisonment and torture in Saudi Arabia for inadequate service of process as to all but one,
and holding that there was no evidence to substantiate the remaining defendants’
involvement).
190. See, e.g., Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332,
1340 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that suit injunction against the deployment of cruise missiles
in a town in England where a U.S. Air Force base was located raised a nonjusticiable
political question). But see Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1512 (D.C.
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courts expressed discomfort interfering with foreign policy decisions made
by the coordinate branches of government—such as the decision to invade a
foreign country or to act in the interests of national security—rather than
with the executive’s desire not to deem the judiciary of a sister sovereign
corrupt or otherwise unable to dispense justice. That is to say, these
doctrines have mostly come into play when the United States is a defendant
rather than amicus or an intervenor (e.g., if the State Department submits a
letter requesting or objecting to dismissal).192 As such, these doctrines
arguably are not hostile toward international law or the foreignness of such
lawsuits. Another ground was the heads of state doctrine, which provides
that current foreign heads of state cannot be liable for actions taken in their
official capacity.193
Plaintiffs prevailed in the four remaining cases, which alleged harms that
went far beyond commercial torts and resembled the fact pattern in
Filártiga—gruesome torture and extrajudicial killing. Three of these suits
were filed against the same foreign officer who acted under color of state
law during Argentina’s Dirty War.194 This trilogy was important because it
established new means for defendants to be held liable for actions they did
not personally commit on the basis of “command responsibility” and helped
establish that the head-of-state immunity doctrine did not apply to former
members of government. Over $89 million was collectively awarded in
these cases, of which only $1000 was ever dispersed.195
B. From the TVPA to Kadic
Perhaps this period should more rightly be deemed the “honeymoon” of
the ATS and the TVPA. From the passage of the TVPA on March 12,
1992, until Kadic v. Karadžić on October 13, 1995, outcomes for plaintiffs
were far more favorable—at least in terms of judgments and nondispositive
opinions that paved the way for future large recoveries. Plaintiffs prevailed
Cir. 1984) (holding that suit against U.S. occupation of Honduran farmers’ land did not raise
a political question).
191. De Arellano v. Weinberger, 788 F.2d 762, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that
Honduran farmers whose land was illegally occupied by a U.S. military training center had
cause of action under the ATS, but that because the occupation was in practical terms over,
there was no standing to issue an injunction).
192. See Stephens, supra note 28, at 793 & n.109 (discussing the Department of State’s
letter in a case involving Exxon and the Indonesian military).
193. See Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (discussing the act of
state doctrine).
194. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 708–09 (N.D. Cal. 1988), No. 87-cv-2058
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 1990) (awarding $8,000,000); Martinez-Baca v. Suarez-Mason, No. C87-2057 SC, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19470, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 1988) (default
judgment for $21,170,699). Although no record exists of the subsequent proceedings in
Westlaw, Lexis, or Bloomberg Law or for the last case, a source reports that default
judgments were awarded. See Lillich, supra note 188, at 207 n.4 (citing Quiros de Rapaport
v. Suárez-Mason, No. 87-cv-2266 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 1989) (awarding $60,004,852)). The
defendant was also extradited to Argentina to face criminal charges. In re Extradition of
Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
195. Sandra Coliver, Bringing Human Rights Abusers to Justice in U.S. Courts: Carrying
Forward the Legacy of the Nuremberg Trials, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1697 (2006).
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approximately 36 percent of the time out of the eleven cases that were fully
resolved during this period, winning three default judgments196 and
hammering out one large settlement.197 Unfortunately, none of the
judgments, which amounted to $81.5 million collectively, was ever
collected.198
These victories rejected several strands of jurisprudence hostile toward
the application of international law, even, for example, the argument
eventually accepted by Kiobel II that the ATS did not apply
extraterritorially, as well as Judge Bork’s argument that the ATS did not
confer a private right of action. The cases pushed back against the new
argument that defendants were protected by the act of state doctrine if their
acts were official. The victories also crystallized new actionable human
rights violations committed by officials—whether committed in the course
of their duties or not. Despite victories, the majority of judgments during
this time period were resolved in favor of defendants on the basis of
sovereign immunity, for the most part not due to any doctrinal
developments but rather to a time lag after Amerada Hess.
First, two victories for plaintiffs upheld a new basis for liability beyond
torture and extrajudicial killing: cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
The plaintiffs in a consolidated case brought under the ATS and TVPA,
Xuncax v. Gramajo,199 alleged that the former Defense Minister of
Guatemala, Hector Gramajo, forced them to flee Guatemala after the
military “ransacked their villages” and murdered, tortured, and falsely
imprisoned them or their family members.200 In the most egregious
example, one of the plaintiffs was forced to watch as soldiers mutilated his
father’s chest, back, and arms; shot him in the legs; and threw him into a
hole filled with “burning mattresses and cardboard.”201 He saw his father’s
burnt body, and when he returned home, his house was incinerated “and his

196. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 169 (D. Mass. 1995) (case against
Guatemalan Minister of Defense); Todd v. Panjaitan, No. 92-Civ-12255, 1994 WL 827111,
at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 1994) (case against Indonesian general awarding $14 million to
plaintiff and also upholding liability on theory of command responsibility in the civil
context); Paul v. Avril (Paul I), 812 F. Supp. 207, 209 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (case against the
former head of the Haitian military).
197. Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1992) (case against
Argentina for kidnapping, torture, arbitrary detention, and forcible exile where sovereign
immunity was waived by Argentina’s actions in related proceedings; the case settled for $6
million).
198. Todd, No. 92-cv-12255 (D. Mass Nov. 14, 1994) (docket entry noting failed service
of judgment); Email from Bob Corbett to Haiti Mailing List (May 30, 2001, 02:49 CDT),
http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/haiti-archive/msg07862.html [hereinafter Corbett Email]
(explaining the Paul judgment had, to date, not been enforced, but speculating that two
plaintiffs received private payments) [http://perma.cc/EQS4-CRD7]; see infra note 204.
199. 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (consolidating Nos. 91-cv-11564 and 91-cv11612).
200. Id. at 169–79. The plaintiffs also sued under Guatemalan, state, and municipal tort
law, and damages were considered on these bases as well. Id. at 200–02.
201. Id. at 170.

1092

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

mother and sibling [were] gone.”202 The court held that certain allegations
(such as forcing plaintiffs to witness the torture of family members)
supported a claim of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.203 The court
awarded the plaintiffs $45.5 million, though the money was never
collected.204
The second case, Paul v. Avril,205 involved a cause of action for cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment and was brought by six prominent
opposition leaders to the Haitian dictatorship. Among other things, they
“ha[d] lit cigarettes inserted in[to] the[ir] nostrils, [were] put in
contortionistic positions while beaten with particular attention being paid to
the skull and groin . . . [were] deliberate[ly] starv[ed],” and were “paraded
on national television and falsely accused of being involved in an
assassination plot.”206 They sued Prosper Avril, the former head of the
Haitian military, for torture, cruel and inhuman treatment, and other
crimes.207 The court awarded a judgment of $41 million to the six
plaintiffs.208 None of the money was collected.209
The victories also rejected some of the arguments proffered against the
application of international law. In Paul, the defendant argued that there
was no subject matter jurisdiction over suits between foreign plaintiffs
against foreign defendants for acts arising outside of the United States; that
following Judge Bork’s opinion in Tel-Oren, the ATS did not give rise to a
cause of action; and, finally, that the act of state and political question
doctrines barred the suit.210 The court rejected each of these arguments in
turn. It held that the text of the ATS, as well as surrounding precedent,
made the statute applicable to “foreign cubed” cases—namely, cases
brought by aliens against other aliens for conduct occurring abroad.211 It
held that Judge Edward’s concurrence in Tel-Oren, which agreed with
Filártiga, was the correct interpretation of the cause of action question.212
And it finally held that the acts at issue did not qualify as “official public
acts,” but instead as acts taken purely under “color of law”—and therefore
202. Id. In the second action, a missionary was “kidnapped, tortured[,] and subjected to
sexual abuse in Guatemala by personnel under Gramajo’s command.” Id. at 173. She sued
under the TVPA. Id. at 176.
203. Id. at 185–89. One of the plaintiffs claimed “constructive expulsion” from
Guatemala. See id. at 189. The court ruled this did not constitute a violation of the law of
nations. Id.
204. Id. at 198–99 (calculating damages under the ATS and TVPA). The court awarded
an additional $2 million in damages under Kentucky law. Id. Gramajo refused to pay.
Xuncax v. Gramajo and Ortiz v. Gramajo, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Oct. 9, 2007), http://ccr
justice.org/ourcases/past-cases/xuncax-v.-gramajo-and-ortiz-v.-gramajo
[http://perma.cc/
93VD-K7JG].
205. 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
206. Id. at 209.
207. Id.
208. Paul v. Avril (Paul II), 901 F. Supp. 330, 336 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (awarding damages
after the defendant failed to appear).
209. See Corbett Email, supra note 198.
210. Paul I, 812 F. Supp. at 209.
211. Id. at 211–12.
212. Id. at 210–19.
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the last two doctrines did not apply.213 Similarly, in Xuncax, the court
addressed Judge Bork’s and Judge Edward’s concurrences in Tel-Oren and
held that the TVPA ratified Filártiga’s approach to the ATS and that the
ATS was not simply jurisdictional, but also enabled plaintiffs to sue for
“harms [that] were committed upon them in violation of international law or
a treaty of the United States.”214
Two other cases not fully resolved during this period produced very
important opinions dealing with some of the same questions. A case
against the former dictator of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, and his
daughter, Imee Marcos-Manotoc, who oversaw military intelligence,
produced a default judgment against Marcos-Manotoc (who failed to
appear) for the kidnapping, torture, and death of a student based on his
political beliefs.215 A district court in Hawai’i awarded his mother $4.16
million in damages and attorneys’ fees under Philippine law.216 The Ninth
Circuit considered whether Marcos-Manotoc was entitled to sovereign
immunity under the FSIA; whether the ATS did not apply extraterritorially;
and whether the ATS was “purely . . . jurisdictional” in nature.217 It
answered “no” to each, reasoning that the acts in question exceeded the
scope of Marcos-Manotoc’s official authority; that the ATS on its face
could be applied to foreign defendants and there was no limitation as to the
“locus of the injury”; and that the ATS recognized municipal torts and thus
was not purely jurisdictional.218 Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit consolidated
this case with other cases brought against Marcos and certified a class
action against his estate, because at that point the dictator had died.219 The
plaintiffs moved to freeze Marcos’s assets, and the district court
complied.220 The Estate appealed.221 While the preliminary injunction was
on appeal, the district court brought the case to trial, and a jury voted on
February 13, 1994, in favor of the class and awarded the plaintiffs $1.2
billion in exemplary damages and $766 million in compensatory

213. Id.
214. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995).
215. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig. (Estate I), 978 F.2d 493,
495–96 (9th Cir. 1992).
216. Id. at 496; Trajano v. Marcos, Nos. 86-Civ-2448, 86-Civ-15039, 1989 WL 76894, at
*2 (9th Cir. Jul. 10, 1989) (“Marcos is a private citizen residing in the United States. Neither
the present government of the Republic of the Philippines nor the United States government
objects to judicial resolution of these claims, or sees any resulting potential embarrassment
to any government. The issues raised, although extraordinarily complex, are within the
capacity of the courts to resolve.”).
217. Estate I, 978 F.2d at 501.
218. Id. at 500. Marcos-Manotoc also made the argument that the extraterritorial
application of the ATS violated Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 501–03. The Ninth
Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the “Arising Under” Clause was meant to
encompass foreign cases and that the United States has the power to incorporate
international law as part of domestic law. Id. at 499–503.
219. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litig. (Estate II), 25 F.3d 1467,
1469 (9th Cir. 1994).
220. Id.
221. Id.
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damages.222 The Ninth Circuit, in considering the interlocutory appeal of
the injunction, reached the same conclusions on all of the issues in the
challenge to the default judgment made by Marcos-Manotoc.223
The remaining cases were dismissed on various grounds, mostly on the
basis of sovereign immunity, though three of these suits were brought
against the United States or an officer of the United States.224 The final
case, Lafontant v. Aristide,225 was dismissed on the basis of head-of-state
immunity in a manner that suggested a quite conservative approach to
international law, if not hostility toward it. There, Lafontant attempted to
prevent the newly elected Haitian President, Jean-Betrand Aristide, from
taking office.226 After the coup failed and Lafontant was jailed, a member
of the Haitian military executed him, allegedly on the orders of President
Aristide.227 Two days later, another military coup succeeded, and Aristide
sought refuge in the United States, which continued to recognize him as
Haiti’s president.228 Lafontant’s widow sued, and Aristide moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that, as a sitting head of state, he was
immune from suit.229 The Department of Justice submitted a statement to
the court that it would be contrary to then-U.S. foreign policy to hold him
accountable for the violations that occurred.230 The court held that based
on principles of comity—which permitted individuals like Prince Charles to
avoid prosecution while in the United States—Aristide should be protected
from liability under both the ATS and the TVPA.231 The only means of
overcoming such immunity would be if the foreign state itself did not
recognize the leader as the legitimate head of state or if the U.S. executive
branch similarly recognized the leader as illegitimate.232 Such was not the
situation here.233 Finally, two other courts granted motions to dismiss on

222. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1996).
223. Estate II, 25 F.3d at 1470–76.
224. Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 967 (4th Cir. 1992)
(dismissing claims against the United States for failing to provide adequate police protection
to civilians during its occupation of Panama, which “damage[d] . . . the property of various
Panamanian businesses that occurred as a result of looting and rioting in the wake” of the
invasion); Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1329–31 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissing case
against the United States for misidentifying and shooting down a civilian aircraft during a
conflict with Iran, killing 290 people); Smith v. Olsen, 76 A.F.T.R.2d 95-6478 (D. Ariz.
1995) (dismissing suit for IRS’s attempt to collect taxes from a nonresident alien under
various statutes, including the ATS); Denegri v. Republic of Chile, No. 86-Civ-3085, 1992
WL 91914, at *1, *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 1992) (dismissing suit against Chile for detaining two
teenagers, dousing them with gasoline, setting them on fire, and denying them adequate
medical treatment).
225. 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
226. Id. at 130.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 130–31.
230. Id. at 131.
231. Id. at 131–32, 137–39.
232. Id. at 132–33. The court further held that the FSIA did not alter head-of-state
immunity. Id. at 137.
233. Id. at 134.

2015]

MEASURING TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

1095

the basis of failure to state a claim under the law of nations,234 and two
dismissed ATS cases for undetermined reasons.235
Of course the case of most importance during this period—which marked
a sea change in how ATS cases came to be litigated—was the Second
Circuit’s unanimous opinion in Kadic. The Second Circuit consolidated
cases brought by two groups of plaintiffs alleging that the President of the
self-proclaimed and unrecognized Bosnian-Serb country of “Srpska”
controlled military forces that committed “genocide, rape, forced
prostitution and impregnation, torture and other cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment, assault and battery, sex and ethnic inequality,
summary execution, and wrongful death.”236 The Second Circuit held that
individuals who were not state officials or acting under color of state law
were capable of being held liable under the ATS—at least for certain
violations of the law of nations.237 Harmonizing its opinion with Judge
Edwards’s concurrence in Tel-Oren, which stated that there are a “handful
of crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual
responsibility,”238 the court broke the allegations into three categories: “(a)
genocide, (b) war crimes, and (c) other instances of inflicting death, torture,
and degrading treatment.”239 It concluded that international law dating
back to at least World War II prohibited genocide and war crimes not only
by state actors, but also by private actors.240 It stated that prohibitions
against torture under the law of nations applied only to state officials or
actors acting under color of law.241 The court also rejected Karadžić’s
argument that the claims were nonjusticiable under the political question or
act of state doctrine and, at the behest of the United States, considered the
possibility of a dismissal based on forum non conveniens.242 It concluded:
“[T]he courts of the former Yugoslavia, either in Serbia or war-torn Bosnia,
are not now available to entertain plaintiffs’ claims, even if circumstances
concerning the location of witnesses and documents were presented that
were sufficient to overcome the plaintiffs’ preference for a United States
234. Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1417–18 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
misrepresentation of the bank’s financial health and insider “looting” of funds did not
amount to breaches of the law of nations); Bagguley v. Matthews, No. 88-Civ-3486, 1992
WL 160945, at *3 (D. Kan. June 3, 1992) (dismissing claims that an alien prisoner’s due
process rights had been violated because his request to serve his sentence in the United
Kingdom was denied on the ground that he failed to allege a treaty violation).
235. The cases that were dismissed for undetermined reasons were Castillo v. Spiliada
Mar. Corp., 937 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1991), which reversed and remanded the dismissal wage
claims brought by Filipino sailors against their former employer, see Castillo v. Spiliada
Mar. Corp., 732 F. Supp. 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), and Jaffe v. Giles, 616 F. Supp. 1371
(W.D.N.Y. 1985), which dismissed claims that an individual was allegedly kidnapped in
Canada and returned to the United States for trial.
236. Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1995).
237. Id. at 236–39.
238. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
239. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241.
240. Id. at 241–43.
241. Id. at 243.
242. Id. at 250–51.
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forum.”243 The court thus demonstrated a high willingness to engage
international law and was quite liberal in its interpretation of it.
C. From Kadic to Sosa
The period from the Second Circuit’s opinion in Kadic until the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sosa was characterized by a lower rate of success for
plaintiffs in terms of judgments obtained against individuals, but also by a
rise in suits against corporations.244 However, judicial resolutions of suits
against corporations and private entities were not reflected in new dismissal
doctrines. In fact, there were few significant developments in these
doctrines until Sosa itself. Courts still grappled with which harms were
actionable under the law of nations, forming an enlarged list, albeit one
with some surprising exceptions. Sovereign immunity continued to be
another principal means of dismissal. Some decisions on this ground
demonstrated reluctance to interfere with foreign affairs, treating it as the
province of the executive. Nevertheless, the United States was usually a
party to these actions rather than an amicus or intervenor attempting to
prevent U.S. courts from sitting in judgment on foreign officials, including
ex-heads of state. As such, these decisions only indicate a desire to protect
the government from actions initiated by aliens rather than a reluctance to
engage human rights abuses abroad because they had nothing to do with the
United States and were too “foreign.” One wrinkle that emerged during the
post-Kadic period, likely a hangover from the passage of the TVPA, was
the insertion of certain TVPA requirements into the ATS. Theoretically,
this could be read as manifesting “isolationism,” but it better reflects the
rise of textualism trickling down from the Supreme Court and the perceived
importance of preemption.
The most important factor for dismissal during this period, like 1980 to
1992, but unlike 1992 to 1995, was the type of harm alleged by the plaintiff
and exactly how egregious it was. Among the cases thrown out under the
law of nations limitation, a few types are intuitive—for example, those
alleging antitrust violations, in particular price-fixing,245 or alleging

243. Id.
244. During the post-Kadic period, there were sixty-one fully resolved ATS and TVPA
suits and many additional pending cases. Out of these sixty-one cases, thirty-five
(approximately 57 percent) were dismissed on a motion to dismiss with prejudice. Three
more were dismissed without prejudice; two more appear to have settled on non-ATS
grounds. Two cases resulted in summary judgment for the defendants. Two jury trials
issued verdicts for the defendants. Seven cases settled. Four cases resulted in default
judgments. Five juries ruled for plaintiffs. The result of one remaining case is unclear, but it
seems it may have settled. This is an overall win rate of approximately 76 percent,
excluding judgments that were never enforced and cases with unknown outcomes.
245. See, e.g., Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., No. 01-Civ-686, 2001 WL
761360, at *1 (D.D.C. June 7, 2001) (dismissing ATS claims for conspiracy to fix prices),
rev’d and vacated on other grounds, 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 155
(2004), aff’d, 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 129 F. Supp.
2d 620, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.
2002).
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violations of domestic statutes such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the
Fair Labor Standards Act246 (FLSA). More significantly, courts rejected
allegations of environmental destruction or health scourges caused by
massive pollution—even if these harms resulted in wide-scale displacement
of communities or destruction of indigenous culture—because such norms
were deemed either insufficiently definite or insufficiently universal to
qualify.247 And, as in other periods, at least one case was dismissed based
on allegations that it resulted in property loss.248 Cases that were not
dismissed on this ground were based, for example, on acts of torture,
extrajudicial killing, arbitrary detention, war crimes (surprisingly, including
expropriation of property),249 or forced labor.
Another important means of dismissal was that of sovereign immunity.
Three of the five cases dismissed on this ground were brought against
sovereign states: the United States,250 Israel,251 and Iran.252 A sixth
additional case considered a novel argument, presented in a suit against
Libya for its role in the suitcase bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, that a jus cogens violation “constitute[d] an implied waiver
within the meaning of the FSIA.”253 The suit was not premised under the
ATS—as many of its victims were U.S. citizens—but drew on the analogy
to Kadic.254 The plaintiffs alleged that because a jus cogens norm, such as
a norm against extrajudicial killing, is a mandatory norm “recognized by
the international community as a norm from which no derogation is
246. See, e.g., Wong-Opasi v. Tenn. State Univ., Nos. 99-5658, 99-5660, slip. op. at 2
(6th Cir. Aug. 16, 2000) (dismissing ATS claims that plaintiff’s employer underpaid her,
denied her tenure, and then dismissed her); Mendonca v. Tidewater, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d
299, 301 (E.D. La. 2001) (dismissing discrimination claims based primarily on Title VII that
plaintiff bolstered by claiming the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination and the International Convention on Civil Rights created a norm
under the law of nations), aff’d, 33 F. App’x 705 (5th Cir. 2002).
247. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 254 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding
in another mining case that the “‘right to life’ and ‘right to health’ [were] insufficiently
definite to constitute rules of customary international law”); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran,
Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that Indonesian citizens’ claims against
mining company for environmental destruction did not rise to a violation of the law of
nations because environmental rights are not universal and sovereigns have a right to impose
their own environmental laws).
248. Maugein v. Newmont Mining Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (D. Colo. 2004)
(dismissing French citizen’s suit over ownership rights in Peruvian gold mine).
249. Two cases alleging expropriation of property were dismissed on sovereign immunity
grounds, one on the political question doctrine, and one settled. Notably, of these, three
claims involved Nazi confiscation of property that belonged to Jews during the Holocaust.
250. U-Series Int’l Servs., Ltd. v. United States, No. 94-Civ-2733, 1995 WL 671567, at
*1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1995) (dismissing ATS as basis for jurisdiction over suit against
United States challenging civil forfeiture of electronics equipment).
251. Hirsh v. State of Israel, 962 F. Supp. 377, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (dismissing
Holocaust survivors’ claims against Germany for redress due to them under treaty), aff’d,
133 F.3d 907 (2d Cir. 1997).
252. Soudavar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 67 F. App’x 618, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(dismissing suit against Iran over transfer of real estate).
253. Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir.
1996).
254. Id. at 241.
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permitted,” no immunity by definition can attach.255 The Second Circuit
rejected this argument based on its interpretation of Congress’s intent in
drafting the FSIA.256 Another suit brought against a Chinese official for the
Tiananmen Square massacre was dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds
as the result of the Department of State’s diplomatic arm-twisting. A judge
in the Southern District of New York initially found that service of process
was complete when the papers were served on a member of the Department
of State’s security detail assigned to protect the official after the court
issued an order requiring the Department of State to serve the defendant.257
But the Department of State never did so and afterward asserted that the
order violated the U.S. government’s sovereign immunity.258 Another
judge in the same district agreed.259 Finally, in a complicated case that
involved many defendants both public and private in the context of Chinese
prison camps where Chinese citizens were allegedly slaves, a district court
in the District of Columbia ruled that the Bank of China was immune from
suit and did not fall within the FSIA’s commercial activities exception.260
A dismissal ground that first manifested during this period was the statute
of limitations (SOL). Under the TVPA, plaintiffs must sue for wrongs
committed against them within ten years of the wrong.261 The text of the
ATS possesses no such restriction.
Nevertheless, courts in some
jurisdictions began to read the requirements of the TVPA or § 1983
(considered an analogous civil rights statute that the court in Kadic
compared to the ATS) backward into the ATS and imported an SOL
requirement there as well.262 In particular, courts tended to apply the SOL
in cases that had to do with wrongs committed far in the past, or at least
relatively speaking. Courts dismissed claims related to the Vietnam War,263
World War II,264 and slavery in the United States.265 Sometimes courts
also justified these decisions on standing grounds—that is to say courts held

255. See supra note 147.
256. Smith, 101 F.3d at 245. A similar argument was considered and rejected in a
Holocaust suit brought in the D.C. Circuit, albeit not expressly on ATS grounds. See Princz
v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
257. Zhou v. Peng, No. 00-Civ-6446, 2002 WL 1835608, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2002),
vacated in part, 286 F. Supp. 2d 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
258. Zhou, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 257.
259. Id.
260. Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2000).
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(c) (2012).
262. See infra notes 263–65.
263. Van Tu v. Koster, 364 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2004) (borrowing the SOL from
the TVPA to dismiss claims by residents of a village in Vietnam against American soldiers).
264. Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 717 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissing claims
against German and Japanese corporations alleging that plaintiffs were forced into slavery
during World War II); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 491 (D.N.J. 1999)
(dismissing claim against motor company for forced labor during World War II and also
holding that the exclusive remedy for such claims was government-to-government
negotiations and the principle of comity).
265. In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1069–71 (N.D.
Ill. 2004) (dismissing claims by formerly enslaved African-Americans or descendants of
formerly enslaved African-Americans).
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that the descendants of victims who suffered abuses were not injured in fact
and therefore could not sue.266 The remaining grounds for dismissal are not
prominent enough to warrant addressing.
The rest of the cases resulted in either victories for the plaintiffs or
settlements. These courts awarded the plaintiffs large sums of money:
$745 million and $4.5 billion, respectively.267 None of the money was
collected.268 In 1996, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the groundbreaking
Marcos jury verdict after various aspects of the trial were challenged.269
Marcos contested a jury instruction that the estate could be held liable if
Marcos knew the military tortured, summarily executed, and “disappeared”
the population “and failed to use his power to prevent it.”270 The Ninth
Circuit ruled that the principle that commanders could be held liable for the
actions of their subordinates was well established under both U.S. and
international law.271 The judgment has yet to be collected.272
Four settlements were also reached, including the first non-Holocaust
settlement against a corporation. Seventy-seven cases were brought against
corporations during this time period, and all were dismissed as to the
corporate defendants but Doe I v. Reddy.273 In Reddy, a group of Indian
immigrants, primarily young women, alleged that the Reddy family, which
owned substantial real estate and ran various businesses in Northern
California, promised them education and employment if they came to the
United States; instead they were forced into involuntary servitude and
sexually and physically abused.274 The case, brought under the ATS for
cruel and inhuman treatment against the Reddy family and the corporations
they owned, settled for $8.9 million in April 2004.275 Before declining to
dismiss the suit at the 12(b)(6) stage, the trial court rejected the defendants’
argument that the claims rested on unratified treaty obligations, instead
concluding that jus cogens norms against slavery were sufficient to render
the acts violations of the law of nations.276 The court did not consider the
issue of whether corporations could be held liable under the ATS, simply
assuming this was the case.277
Two nondispositive opinions paved the way for corporate liability. First,
in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,278 a court in the Southern District
of New York held that businesses acting in tandem with a government, for

266. See, e.g., id. at 1047–48.
267. See supra note 131.
268. See supra note 132.
269. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 1996).
270. Id. at 776–79.
271. Id. at 777.
272. See Alvic & Nonato, supra note 130, at S1.
273. No. 3:02-Civ-05570, 2003 WL 23893010 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2003).
274. Id.
275. Doe I v. Reddy, No. 3:02-cv-05570, slip op. at 2–7 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2004)
(discussing settlement reached on April 7, 2004).
276. Reddy, 2003 WL 23893010, at *8.
277. Id.
278. No. 91-Civ-8386, 2002 WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
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example through a conspiracy, could violate the law of nations and thereby
be held accountable under the ATS.279 Another opinion, issued by the
Ninth Circuit in 2002, also bolstered support for the theory that
corporations could be held liable under the ATS. On appeal in Unocal, the
Ninth Circuit held that despite the fact that the oil company was a private
actor, it could be held liable as a nongovernment entity for certain actions—
such as torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings—because they were in
furtherance of acts (in this case, slavery) that violated the law of nations and
were actionable if committed by nonstate actors.280 It also held that the oil
giant could be held accountable for aiding and abetting the Myanmar
military.281 The Ninth Circuit deemed this holding consistent with TelOren but vacated the opinion on settlement.282
The most important case of this period was unquestionably Sosa.283 The
Supreme Court held that norms recognized as falling under the law of
nations must be as “well-established” as those “accepted by the civilized
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18thcentury paradigms,” such as piracy, violations of safe conduct, and offenses
against ambassadors.284 Perhaps the most intriguing part of Sosa—which
both foreshadowed and contradicted the Court’s ruling in Kiobel II—was
Justice Breyer’s concurrence.
While subscribing to the majority’s
limitation on the law of nations, he wrote separately addressing principles
of comity that undergird the ATS.285 Universal jurisdiction, he suggested,
is appropriate in certain instances involving purely foreign actors, for
example when they commit genocide, war crimes, or torture and a
procedural consensus exists such that these crimes could be tried anywhere
in the world.286 He implied, however, that holding foreign actors liable for
actions outside the United States might be inconsistent with respect for the
sovereignty of other states where the norms raise the possibility of
conflicting with foreign laws.287 He concluded that in Sosa’s case—where
foreign actors arrested Sosa in another country—the lack of a procedural
consensus around the illegality of the action “provide[d] additional support
for the Court’s conclusion that the ATS [did] not recognize . . . underlying
substantive claim[s] . . . outside the United States, of a citizen of one
foreign country by another.”288
Properly read, Sosa is not isolationist. A better reading is that Sosa
actively engages principles of international law, but does so in a
conservative and cautious manner. Sosa actively proclaims that the ATS is
279. Id. at *1313. The case later settled in 2009.
280. Unocal II, 395 F.3d 932, 944–56 (9th Cir. 2002), appeal dismissed per stipulation en
banc, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
281. Id. at 954–56.
282. Id. at 945.
283. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machaín, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
284. Id. at 692, 694.
285. Id. at 761 (Breyer, J., concurring).
286. Id. at 761–62.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 763.
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not “stillborn,” meaning that it permits a “claim for relief without a further
statute expressly authorizing adoption of causes of action.”289 The justices
may have intended to narrow the type of actionable claims by cabining the
definition of the law of nations. There are certainly many claims under
treaties that courts do not recognize as creating such a norm, and Sosa did
nothing to dispel, and in fact amplified, opposition to causes of actions
based on treaties alone. Sosa merely insisted that claims brought under the
ATS be jus cogens violations—namely violations with a strong
international consensus against them.
D. From Sosa to Kiobel II
Sosa, in tandem with Wiwa and Unocal, ushered in a new era in ATS
litigation—but not always in the manner currently understood. Scholars are
right that this period was one of the hardest for ATS practitioners and
reflected a narrower approach to certain doctrines.290 Nevertheless, such
narrowing did not prevent many positive developments for plaintiffs from
taking place, including extremely large corporate settlements.
At least four notable trends manifested during this period. First, the
prediction that Sosa would shake the ATS at its foundation proved false:
the list of actionable claims actually expanded even though the overall
dismissal rate was higher. And Sosa left untouched core causes of action,
imposing only a requirement that the harm suffered must be factually severe
enough to support one or more of them. A new, unstudied change in this
doctrine in certain circuits, however, had to do with secondary liability.
Plaintiffs depended on theories of secondary liability, such as aiding and
abetting the state in its perpetration of human rights violations, to
circumvent the rule that private actors cannot commit violations of the law
of nations through extrajudicial killings and torture that would otherwise
only qualify as wrongful death or assault. Certain courts now held that
claims against corporations based on such theories must allege purpose
instead of knowledge on the issue of intent.
Second, the hydraulics within the doctrine of sovereign immunity shifted.
Courts began holding government officers—as opposed to agencies such as
government banks—immune under the FSIA on the basis that they
289. Id. at 714.
290. See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 13, at 1511. During this period, over two and a half
times more cases were resolved than from 1995 to 2004, for a total of 160, excluding
frivolous and pro se cases. The massive increase in litigation is largely attributed to the rise
of suits against corporations. Indeed, of these 160 suits, sixty-eight (42 percent) saw
corporations as defendants. Comparable figures from earlier periods show a lower
magnitude: for example, from 1995 through 2004 only twenty-seven suits against corporate
defendants were resolved, and twenty-seven additional opinions were issued. But while
more claims were brought, more claims were shunted. One hundred twenty-seven out of the
160 cases (79 percent) resolved in favor of defendants. Of the remaining cases, one motion
to dismiss was denied, eleven default judgments were granted, five trials led to verdicts for
the plaintiffs, and summary judgment was granted to the plaintiffs in the final case. Twelve
cases settled. One case was a split decision for the plaintiff and defendant. The remaining
cases had unknown outcomes or were dismissed voluntarily.
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qualified as state instrumentalities. The Supreme Court rejected this
approach in 2010 but left the door ajar for the application of common law
immunity to state officials.291
Third, this period experienced a huge takeoff in the number of suits
against corporations. Only two judgments—both default judgments—held
a corporation liable under the ATS.292 But this period saw a number of
important settlements, including Wiwa and Unocal. Toward the end of the
period, a debate emerged over whether a corporation could be considered a
“person” under international law. There were also some developments in
TVPA jurisprudence relating to the aiding and abetting question. Finally,
of course, the Supreme Court handed down Kiobel II.
Based on Sosa’s narrowing of violations amounting to those under the
law of nations, one would expect a narrower range of cases dismissed on
this ground. One hypothesis is that claimants initially sued for breaches of
commercial contract or fraud or other economic torts in the wake of
Filártiga’s cryptic methodology of defining the law of nations, which lower
courts struggled with for years. Prior to Sosa, the most successful claims
tended to be Holocaust related (though some of these failed) or alleged
genocide, war crimes, extrajudicial killing, disappearance, “official” torture,
arbitrary detention, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, or forced
labor. After Sosa, the list broadened to include proxies of terrorist acts293
and human experimentation.294 On the other hand, claims dismissed postSosa include terrorism itself,295 child custody,296 slavery in the nineteenth
century,297 failure to compensate wartime destruction of property,298 private

291. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 308, 324 (2010).
292. See supra note 123.
293. See, e.g., Mwani v. Bin Ladin, No. 99-Civ-125, 2006 WL 3422208, at *4–5 (D.D.C.
Sept. 28, 2006) (handing down default judgment to a class of five thousand Kenyans who
were the victims of a terrorist attack on the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, because the act violated
“the rights of ambassadors,” without questioning the plaintiffs’ standing to bring such
claims).
294. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009).
295. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2013)
(dismissing claims under the ATS because terrorism was not an established violation of the
law of nations and a TVPA claim because it was not committed under color of state law).
296. See, e.g., Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 776, 782 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding crossborder child abduction did not violate the law of nations, and considerations of comity with
the Dominican Republic precluded suit).
297. See, e.g., Hereros ex rel. Riruako v. Deutsche Afrika-Linien Gmblt & Co., 232 F.
App’x 90, 93–95 (3d Cir. 2007) (relying on Sosa’s definition of the law of nations to
conclude that, despite the court’s inclination to view slavery from 1899 to 1915 as a
violation of the law of nations, a “mere inclination” did not “support a cause of action in [its]
reading of Sosa”).
298. See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 854–55 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (citing Sosa to dismiss a suit against the United States without addressing the
question of sovereign immunity for bombing a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in the
mistaken belief that the plant supplied Al Qaeda and failing to provide compensation for
such destruction).
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torture,299 and the use of toxic chemicals in areas with civilians, among
others.300
Courts did dismiss claims post-Sosa that might have qualified as
violations under the law of nations had they been “severe” enough. For
example, in Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co.,301 Judge Posner,
writing for the Seventh Circuit, held that allegations of forced child labor on
a Liberian rubber plantation “while bad, [were] not that bad” and therefore
did not violate the law of nations.302 This was because “[a]griculture is the
sector with the most child labourers [sic] . . . [and] also the sector with the
most potential for decent work for rural children and young adolescents
who have reached the legal minimum age of employment.”303 Additional
cases ruled out what would have otherwise qualified as violations of the law
of nations or torture or extrajudicial killing if the facts alleged had
supported the claims.304
Another extremely important question that arose during this period was
whether aiding and abetting governments in committing violations of the
law of nations was actionable. Such aiding and abetting claims formed the
basis for most corporate liability lawsuits: plaintiffs rarely alleged that
corporations themselves committed acts of torture or extrajudicial killings,
known as “direct liability,” because courts usually held such that customary
international law only recognized torture and extrajudicial killing
committed under color of law.305 As a result, most victims of corporate
human rights abuses alleged that corporations aided and abetted regimes in
the country where the violation occurred. Courts were split on the degree
of intent necessary for such aiding and abetting claims. For example, as the
Ninth Circuit held in Unocal, the standard for aiding and abetting was
“knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect
on the perpetration of the crime.”306 Both the D.C. and Eleventh Circuits
agreed the standard was “knowing.”307 Other courts disagreed, holding a
299. See, e.g., Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 15–16 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that
claims that a private military contractor committed torture abroad did not violate the law of
nations because the contractor was not acting under color of law, and therefore its actions
merely constituted assault and battery).
300. See, e.g., Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d
104, 109 (2d Cir. 2008) (dismissing claim for wartime use of chemical that caused civilian
deaths and injuries because its purpose was to destroy forests used to disguise the Viet
Cong).
301. 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011).
302. Id. at 1023.
303. Id. at 1024 (basing this holding on a motion for judgment on the pleadings that was
converted into a motion for summary judgment).
304. E.g., Mohamed v. Holder, No. 1:11-Civ-50, 2011 WL 3820711, at *1 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 26, 2011) (dismissing suit under TVPA because allegations of physical abuse did not
amount to torture).
305. See, e.g., Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 15–16 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
306. Unocal II, 395 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 2002), appeal dismissed per stipulation en
banc, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
307. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 Fed.
App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157–60 (11th Cir.
2005).
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claim under the law of nations for aiding and abetting must allege purpose
to constitute a violation of customary international law and, thereby, a
violation of the law of nations as well.308 In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.309 (Kiobel I), Judge Pierre N. Leval concurred in the
judgment, asserting that the degree of mens rea, based on customary
international law under an aiding and abetting theory, must be purpose.310
Many other cases were dismissed on the ground of immunity doctrines,
including sovereign immunity, diplomatic immunity, and head-of-state
immunity. A few such actions were brought against governments despite
Amerada Hess, though often these suits included state officials or other
parties as defendants. Courts began to address whether state officers were
immune under the FSIA or if the FSIA only applied to states and their
instrumentalities. Some courts held—in tension with Filártiga—that state
officers qualified as state instrumentalities when acting in their official
capacities under “color of law” or that if the state “ratified” their actions,
sovereign immunity applied.311 Other courts, including those in the Second
Circuit, reached similar conclusions—again in tension with Filártiga—on a
common law basis.312 Many of the cases were against an officer of a
government allied with the United States—such as Israel—while officials
of other countries did not receive this type of protection. In the Supreme
Court’s third decision treating the ATS, the 2010 case Samantar v.
Yousuf,313 the Court unanimously rejected the FSIA argument but left the
door open to the possibility that these officials might be protected by
common law immunity.314
In certain ATS cases against U.S. officers, courts have held that the
Westfall Act315 allows the United States to substitute itself as the defendant
when the acts in question occurred within the scope of an officer’s
employment, thereby barring suit under the domestic law doctrine of

308. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247–48
(2d Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment for a corporation
that allegedly provided assistance to the government of Sudan in committing genocide and
war crimes because the plaintiffs could not prove the company acted with the purpose of
harming Sudanese citizens); Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 401 (4th Cir. 2011)
(adopting the Second Circuit’s reasoning).
309. 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
310. Id. at 158 (Leval, J., concurring in the judgment).
311. E.g., Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (dismissing a suit
against the head of Israeli Army Intelligence brought by victims of the Israeli bombing in
Lebanon in which the State Department submitted a letter to the court).
312. Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14–15 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding, in the context of
another suit against an Israeli officer, that “in the common-law context, we defer to the
Executive’s determination of the scope of immunity”).
313. 560 U.S. 305 (2010).
314. Id. at 308, 324.
315. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation (Westfall) Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2679 (2012) (allowing the United States to substitute itself as a defendant in most
tort claims brought against government officers acting within the scope of their
employment).
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sovereign immunity.316 Other courts recognized diplomatic immunity, even
if diplomats were not committing crimes in their diplomatic capacity.317 As
in previous periods, sitting heads of state were immune even when the acts
were committed prior to assuming their presidencies.318
Far less significant, grounds for dismissing lawsuits from Sosa to Kiobel
II included personal jurisdiction (some for inadequate service of process
and some for insufficient minimum contacts with the forum in question),
forum non conveniens, the political question doctrine, the state secrets
privilege, and preemption. Finally, this period witnessed the first pushback
against corporate liability under the ATS. For a decade and a half, courts
assumed corporate liability attached under the law of nations. The Second
Circuit itself deemed corporations subject to the law of nations nine times
prior to Kiobel I.319 In Kiobel I, however, the Second Circuit changed
course. In a 2-1 opinion, the majority found that while corporations are
considered persons under domestic law, they are not persons under
international law, and hence there is no jurisdiction over them under the
statute.320 The court held that the word “persons” must be interpreted under
international law rather than domestic law, and because no successful suit
had been brought against a corporation per se, despite the World War II
Industrialist Cases, which held that the leaders of businesses that supported
the Nazis could be criminally liable under international law,321 no norm
established liability.322 Other circuits such as the Eleventh Circuit
disagreed.323
With regard to the TVPA, there were several specific grounds for
dismissal. First, courts held that its remedies did not apply retroactively.324
316. See, e.g., Sobitan v. Glud, 589 F.3d 379, 388–89 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the
Westfall Act applies to claims under the ATS that are brought pursuant to a treaty); Rasul v.
Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26, 34 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that torture of suspected terrorists
was within the scope of employment), aff’d sub nom. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C.
Cir. 2009).
317. See, e.g., Devi v. Silva, 861 F. Supp. 2d 135, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (dismissing suit
against Sri Lankan military commander and diplomat allegedly responsible for the torture
and killing of an ethnic minority population because the Diplomatic Relations Act entitles
diplomats to immunity, notwithstanding the ATS and TVPA).
318. See, e.g., Habyarimana v. Kagame, 696 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 2012)
(dismissing suit brought by widows of former Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi against the
current President of Rwanda for allegedly killing their husbands by shooting down their
plane with a missile before taking office).
319. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 254 n.125 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(collecting cases).
320. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d 111, 118–20 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that the standard employed
under the ATS must be that of customary international law and further finding that, under
this standard, there is no norm, much less a universal one, to support corporate liability under
the ATS), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
321. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 477 (2001) (discussing post-World War II criminal
prosecutions of the leaders of large German corporations for aiding slave labor and
deportation).
322. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 131–42.
323. See, e.g., Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
324. See Ditullio v. Boehm, 662 F.3d 1091, 1099–100 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Second, courts dismissed suits brought by persons other than the victim or
on behalf of the victim (i.e., a “representative or administrator of [the
victim’s] estate”)325 despite the fact that the wording of the statute
authorizes suits by “a claimant in an action for wrongful death.”326
Additionally, many courts held that the TVPA did not protect victims from
defendants who were not individuals, meaning it did not protect them from
corporations, states, or nonstate entities even if these entities aided and
abetted individuals in committing their acts under color of state law.327 In
2012, the Supreme Court supported this conclusion in a case involving a
victim allegedly tortured and killed at the hands of the PLO, ruling that the
word “individual” as opposed to “person” used in the TVPA meant that
private actors such as the PLO could not be held liable.328
Despite this doctrinal stiffening, plaintiffs prevailed in several cases
under both the ATS and the TVPA—including two default judgments on
the issue of human trafficking and forced labor that led to awards of $13.5
million and $7.6 million, respectively.329 One of two standing judgments
against corporations was handed down in 2008, before the Second Circuit’s
Kiobel I decision holding that corporations could not be liable for violations
of the law of nations. The complaint alleged that a U.S. forestry company
induced numerous workers to come from Guatemala on the promise of H-2
visas and then confiscated their passports and made them work in harsh
conditions without adequate health care or remuneration.330 Other default
judgments included a $47 million victory against the former Honduran
military intelligence chief for torture and disappearances,331 a $10 million
award against an El Salvadorian former security chief who acted under
color of law in assassinating an Archbishop while he was giving mass,332
and a default judgment for approximately $8.6 million on the basis of the
kidnapping and arbitrary detention of the Acting President of the American
University of Beirut by Hezbollah.333
In addition, TVPA claims
contributed to summary judgment for hundreds of millions of dollars for the
1989 bombing of a flight from Brazzaville, Congo, to Paris by Libyan
325. Fisher v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 541 F. Supp. 2d 46, 54–
55 n.10 (D.D.C. 2008).
326. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a)(2) (2012).
327. See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissing
TVPA claims against oil company for allegedly paying the Nigerian military to attack
victims on an offshore platform).
328. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1709–10 (2012).
329. Magnifico v. Villanueva, No. 10-Civ-80771, 2012 WL 5395026, at *1 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 2, 2012) (awarding judgment in case alleging causes of action under RICO, the
TVPRA, the FLSA, and state law, in addition to the ATS and TVPA); Aguilar v. Imperial
Nurseries, No. 07-Civ-00193, 2008 WL 2572250, at *1–2 (D. Conn. May 28, 2008)
(granting default judgment).
330. Complaint at 182–89, 257–64, Aguilar, 2007 WL 1183549 (elaborating facts alleged
against the company).
331. Reyes v. Grijalba, 02-cv-22046 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2006).
332. Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
333. Dodge v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03-Civ-252, 2004 WL 5353873, at *5
(D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2004) (assigning damages not only under the TVPA, but also under the
Flatow Amendment with jurisdiction arising under the FSIA).
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officials that killed all 170 passengers, including seven U.S. citizens,
despite the fact that certain courts had held the application of the TVPA was
not retroactive.334 Jury trials also resulted in verdicts for plaintiffs,
including in a case for torture and extrajudicial killing by El Salvadorian
soldiers,335 and in a case for arbitrary detention and extrajudicial killing of
an economist appointed by Chilean President Salvador Allende who was
overthrown in a military coup d’état.336
Twelve cases also settled, including seven against corporations, the most
important of which are Unocal and Wiwa. Unocal settled in 2005 for $30
million before the case could be reheard en banc and before Unocal’s
merger with Chevron.337 Wiwa finally settled in 2009 for $15.5 million.338
The four other settlements against corporations included two cases against
security contractors in Iraq brought under the ATS, another brought under
the TVPA,339 and a case against Yahoo! for allegedly giving the Chinese
government access to emails of political dissidents who were subsequently
arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and subjected to cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment.340
After the Second Circuit in Kiobel I held that corporations were not
persons under customary international law and therefore could not be liable
under the ATS, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on this question.341
After oral argument, the Court placed the case back on the calendar and
instructed the parties to brief “whether and under what circumstances the
Alien Tort Statute . . . allows courts to recognize a cause of action for
violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign
other than the United States.”342 This move was unexpected, but not
entirely so. After Kiobel I, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the
defendants’ identical argument in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC.343 Judge

334. Pugh v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, No. 02-Civ-02026, 2006 WL
2384915, at *9 (D.D.C. May 11, 2006).
335. Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 490 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding jury verdict
awarding $6 million).
336. Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding
verdict). The jury awarded Cabello’s survivors $3 million in compensatory damages and $1
million in punitive damages. Id.
337. Goldhaber, supra note 11, at 129.
338. Id. at 128.
339. Manook v. Unity Res. Grp., No. 10-01970 (4th Cir. Mar. 16, 2011) (dismissing
appeal pursuant to a voluntary stipulation by the plaintiff); In re XE Servs. Alien Tort Litig.,
Nos. 1:09-cv-615, 1:09-cv-616, 1:09-cv-617, 1:09-cv-618, 1:09-cv-645 (E.D. Va. Jan. 6,
2010) (approving confidential settlement agreement).
340. Xiaoning v. Yahoo!, No. 4:07-cv-02151 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2007) (dismissing case
pursuant to settlement).
341. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491)
(phrasing the question in terms of corporate immunity); Order Granting Writ in Tandem with
Mohamad v. Rajoub., Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
342. Order Restoring the Case to the Calendar for Reargument and Directing the Parties
to File Supplemental Briefs, Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
343. 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995
(20013); see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold
that there is no extraterritoriality bar.”).
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Kleinfeld, joined by Judges Bea and Ikuta, dissented.344 Judge Kleinfeld
argued that the text or context of a statute must clearly indicate it has
extraterritorial application for jurisdiction to attach based on the Supreme
Court’s recent securities jurisprudence.345 The ATS met neither criterion,
he argued, on the facts of a “foreign cubed” case.346 Judge Kleinfeld
described the majority’s logic as “a new imperialism, entitling our court[s],
and not the peoples of other countries, to make the law governing persons
within those countries” that “now asserts entitlement to make law for all the
peoples of the entire planet.”347 Nevertheless, at the time the Supreme
Court ordered reargument in Kiobel II, no court had ruled that the ATS
lacked extraterritorial application. The Supreme Court unanimously
affirmed the Second Circuit on this basis on April 17, 2013.348
E. From Kiobel II to the Present
Only two and a half years have transpired since Kiobel II. As a result, it
is impossible to make predictions as to how cases will play out in the long
run without some degree of speculation. What can be said is that, despite
prognostications that the ATS is dead and that the presumption against
extraterritoriality has eliminated any chance of plaintiffs’ prevailing, this
has not proved true thus far. Though the predominant means of dismissing
cases is now the presumption, many of these cases might not have
succeeded anyway for other reasons, such as an inability to plead purpose in
aiding and abetting suits against corporations or the gravity of the harms
alleged. And many lower courts have taken pains to follow Justice Breyer’s
concurrence in Kiobel II and interpreted the presumption narrowly, holding
that exceptions apply when part of the tort has been committed on U.S.
soil.349 That said, fewer ATS and TVPA cases have been filed since Kiobel
II than in previous periods,350 suggesting the precedent has deterred
344. 671 F.3d at 797–818 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
345. Id. at 803–11 (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), a
securities case, in support of the presumption).
346. Id. at 809–11.
347. Id. at 798.
348. Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).
349. See, e.g., Mwani v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding defendant
liable in an action for default judgment for a truck bomb that exploded at the U.S. embassy
in Kenya on the ground that the embassy had a sufficient nexus to the United States); Ahmed
v. Magan, 2:10-Civ-00342, 2013 WL 4479077, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013) (holding
that a U.S. citizen who aided and abetted the Somali national security service in torturing
and committing cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment against the plaintiff was liable in a
default judgment action), aff’d, 2013 WL 5493032, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2013) (awarding
$5,000,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages).
350. The prevailing wisdom as of April 2014 was that no such cases were filed postKiobel II. See JOHN BELLINGER III & REEVES ANDERSON, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, AS KIOBEL TURNS ONE, ITS EFFECT REMAINS UNCLEAR (2014), http://www.institute
forlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Kiobel_Anniversary_Paper__April_29_2014_.pdf
[http://perma.cc/C46F-LVXG]. This is untrue, as can be seen from the following string cite
that captures all ATS and ATS/TVPA cases filed since Kiobel II by doing a data scrap from
Bloomberg, where I searched for the section of the U.S. Code in which the ATS resides. See
Brill v. Chevron Corp., No. 3:15-cv-04916 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2015); Dogan v. Barak, No.
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plaintiffs from pursuing human rights claims under the statute despite
chances of prevailing if the suit is strong in other respects. In addition,
courts have held that Kiobel II leaves the TVPA untouched and that the
TVPA displaces the presumption against extraterritoriality.351
As of the date of this Article, sixty ATS and TVPA cases since Kiobel II
had been fully resolved, with many additional pending cases. Of the fully
resolved cases, forty-two (70 percent) were dismissed on a motion to
dismiss,352 and defendants currently have an 86 percent win rate—the
highest of any period, but specifically high due to voluntary dismissals.353
The high level of voluntary dismissals perhaps suggests that plaintiffs are
being deterred from pursuing cases under the ATS, and indeed newly filed
cases appear to originate from unseasoned lawyers from the plaintiffs’ bar
who lack familiarity with the intricacies of the statute.
The presumption against extraterritoriality was by far the most prominent
ground invoked in dismissing these cases. Sixteen of the forty motions to
dismiss in favor of the defendant (40 percent) were felled by the
presumption, though many of the dismissals involved other grounds as
well.354 Many of the cases dismissed under the presumption were “foreign
cubed” cases, i.e., cases in which the plaintiff was an alien, the defendant
was foreign, and the tort occurred outside of the territory of the United
States. For example, a court in the District of Columbia dismissed a
complaint alleging that Iranian banks funded a terrorist group responsible

2:15-cv-08130 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2015); Salim v. Mitchell, No. 2:15-cv-00286 (E.D. Wash.
Oct. 13, 2015); Dalziel v. Malaysia Airlines, No. 1:15-cv-06202 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 2015);
You v. Japan, No. 4:15-cv-03257 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2015); Singh v. Manjit Singh G.K., No.
1:15-cv-05372 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2015); Ali Jaber v. United States, No. 1:15-cv-00840
(D.D.C. June 7, 2015); Ladra v. Rubias, No. 1:15-cv-04231 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2015);
Alarcon v. Holloway, No. 1:15-cv-03095 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 2015); Sikhs for Justice Inc. v.
Bachchan, No. 2:14-cv-08297 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2014); Am. Justice Ctr., Inc. v. Modi, No.
1:14-cv-07780 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2014); Klayman v. Obama, No. 1:14-cv-01484 (D.D.C.
Aug. 28, 2014); Gallegos v. United States, No. 5:14-cv-00136 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2014);
Sauter v. Citigroup, No. 1:14-cv-05812 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2014); Jawad v. Hagel, No. 1:14cv-00811 (D.D.C. May 15, 2014); Doe No. 117 v. Singer, No. 2:14-cv-03530 (C.D. Cal.
May 7, 2014); Gonzalez v. S. Sioux City Police Dep’t, No. 4:14-cv-03089 (D. Neb. May 1,
2014); Doe v. Pure Forest, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-00879 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2014); William v.
AES Corp., No. 1:14-cv-00343 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2014); Tawfik v. Al-Sabah, No. 13 Civ.
4923 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2013); Jara v. Barrientos Nunez, No. 3:13-cv-01075 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 4, 2013); Sikhs for Justice Inc. v. Gandhi, No. 1:13-cv-04920 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2013);
Sun v. China Petroleum & Chem. Corp., No. 2:13-cv-05355 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2013); Sikhs
for Justice v. Badal, No. 1:13-cv-04418 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2013); Delgado v. Villanueva,
No. 1:13-cv-22259 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2013); Quintero Perez v. United States, No. 3:13-cv01417 (S.D. Cal. June 17, 2013); Ahmad v. Found. for Int’l Res. & Ed., No. 1:13-cv-03376
(S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2013).
351. See, e.g., Doe v. Drummond Co., Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 602 (11th Cir. 2015).
352. See supra note 37.
353. One default judgment was denied and one was reversed, one jury trial for the
plaintiff was reversed, one motion for summary judgment on the part of the defendant was
granted, two cases were dismissed sua sponte, and six groups of plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed their ATS claims, though one of the last may have settled. Two other cases
settled, which I do not count as victories for the defendant.
354. See supra Part II.D; supra Table 1.
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for the death of civilians in Israel on this basis that the action had no ties
whatsoever to the United States.355
Many among the plaintiffs’ bar had hoped that courts would be reluctant
to dismiss “foreign squared” cases—cases in which the defendant is a U.S.
citizen—but many such claims have been dismissed, or have at least
stipulated that U.S. citizenship alone is not dispositive.356 For example, in
Mujica v. AirScan Inc.,357 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants—both
U.S. citizens—had “aided and abetted and conspired” with the Colombian
Air Force in bombing near an oil pipeline to kill insurgents but instead
killed numerous innocent civilians.358 The court affirmed the dismissal of
the case, stating that these allegations were based on “speculation” not
“factual matter, accepted as true” and refused to grant the plaintiffs leave to
amend.359 Judge Zilly, sitting by designation, dissented in part.360 He
quoted Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Kiobel II for the proposition that
“[m]any countries permit foreign plaintiffs to bring suits against their own
nationals based on unlawful conduct that took place abroad.”361 Judge Zilly
would have held that nationality of the defendant was enough to confer
subject matter jurisdiction even where no underlying conduct occurred in
the United States.362 Had the Mujica plaintiffs made specific allegations
that met the Iqbal pleading standard without having had the benefit of
discovery, it is unclear how the Ninth Circuit would have ruled.
Courts have also considered whether a U.S. citizen’s actions in the
United States—such as planning or financing—create a sufficient nexus to
displace the presumption of extraterritoriality. Most starkly, in Balintulo v.
Daimler AG,363 the Second Circuit initially rejected the argument adopted
by the Breyer concurrence and found that “violations of the law of nations
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States”
are not actionable “in all cases.”364 It dismissed the plaintiffs’ arguments
that U.S. corporations’ provision of goods to the South African government
after apartheid “tie[d] the relevant human rights violations to actions taken
within the United States” and that the corporations could not be
“vicariously liable for that conduct under the ATS.”365
355. Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran, 961 F. Supp. 2d 185, 205 (D.D.C.
2013).
356. Drummond, 782 F.3d at 595 (“We find that the citizenship or corporate status of the
defendants can guide us in our navigation of the touch and concern inquiry even though it
does not firmly secure our jurisdiction.”).
357. 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2014).
358. Id. at 584–85, 592.
359. Id. at 592.
360. Id. at 615–23 (Zilly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
361. Id. at 618 (quoting Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1675 (2013) (Breyer J., concurring)).
362. Id. at 617.
363. 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013).
364. Id. at 189–92.
365. Id. at 188 (denying the defendants’ writ of mandamus and remanding to the district
court so the defendants could “seek the dismissal of all of the plaintiffs’ claims, and prevail,
prior to discovery, through a motion for judgment on the pleadings”). On remand, the
district court ruled that any amendments to the complaint would be futile because the
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Yet some cases might be able to sufficiently allege a nexus if they
involved “much greater contact with the United States government,
military, citizens, and territory.”366 The best hope for ATS plaintiffs lies in
the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology,
Inc.367 Al Shimari dealt with a Virginia-based private security contractor,
CACI, and its involvement in Abu Ghraib.368 It treated the company’s
interrogators and the “sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses [they]
inflicted on several detainees,” which included being “‘repeatedly beaten,’
‘shot in the leg,’ ‘repeatedly shot in the head with a taser gun,’ ‘subjected to
mock execution,’ ‘threatened with unleashed dogs,’ ‘stripped naked,’ ‘kept
in a cage,’ ‘beaten on [the] genitals with a stick,’ ‘forcibly subjected to
sexual acts,’ and ‘forced to watch’ the ‘rape[ ][of] a female detainee.’”369
According to the plaintiffs, CACI “failed to hire suitable interrogators,
insufficiently supervised CACI employees, ignored reports of abuse, and
attempted to ‘cover up’ the misconduct.”370 The Fourth Circuit held that
the phrase “relevant conduct” used by the Supreme Court in Kiobel II was
not coextensive with the term “claims.”371 In this case the claims had a
sufficient nexus because they “allege[d] acts of torture committed by
United States citizens who were employed by an American corporation,
CACI, which has corporate headquarters located in Fairfax County,
Virginia,” “[t]he alleged torture occurred at a military facility operated by
United States government personnel,” “the employees who allegedly
participated in the acts of torture were hired by CACI in the United States
to fulfill the terms of a contract that CACI executed with the United States
Department of the Interior . . . [that] required CACI interrogators . . . to
obtain security clearances from the United States Department of Defense,”
and, most importantly, “allege[d] that CACI’s managers located in the
United States were aware of reports of misconduct abroad, attempted to
‘cover up’ the misconduct, and ‘implicitly, if not expressly, encouraged’
it.”372

defendants could not establish a sufficient nexus to the United States as the “relevant
conduct”—namely the defendants’ financial support of apartheid—did not support
jurisdiction because the actions in question were committed by their South African
subsidiaries. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 56 F. Supp. 3d 331, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that, in fact, IBM’s design of products used by the
South African regime did “touch and concern” the United States but there were insufficient
allegations of purpose to meet the aiding and abetting requirement. Balintulo v. Ford Motor
Co., 796 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2015).
366. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 56 F. Supp. at 338.
367. 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014). Note that the case was remanded to the lower court,
where it was dismissed on the basis that the U.S. military was so intertwined with the
contractors that the case was a nonjusticiable political question. See Al Shimari v. CACI
Premier Tech., Inc., No. 1:08-Civ-00827, 2015 WL 4740217, at *9 (E.D. Va. June 18, 2015).
The case is currently on appeal with respect to this holding.
368. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 520.
369. Id. at 521.
370. Id. at 522.
371. Id. at 527.
372. Id. at 528–29.
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Nevertheless, even if plaintiffs successfully allege contact between the
United States and the claim, they may face heightened evidentiary burdens
as they progress to summary judgment or if the court conducts jurisdictional
discovery. For example, in Doe v. Drummond Co.,373 the court treated the
coal giant’s alleged direct and indirect payments to the Colombian terrorist
group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) to provide “security” for
the company’s operations and was “fully aware” of the group’s terrorist
designation.374 The “arrangement” between Drummond and AUC, which
was nominally to eliminate guerilla groups that threatened the mines,
allegedly resulted in war crimes, extrajudicial killings, and crimes against
humanity.375 On a motion for summary judgment, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the plaintiff’s evidence of “general” contacts between Drummond
and AUC—which included testimony that Drummond’s president and other
Drummond employees “consent[ed]” to fund the AUC and even to the
murders themselves—was insufficient to overcome the presumption.376
The court held that more specific evidence that the company’s actions were
“directed at” the violations was required to displace the presumption.377
Drummond suggests that, at least in the Eleventh Circuit, the defendant’s
intent is a factor in considering the presumption despite the court’s explicit
statement that the standard for aiding and abetting is knowledge.378
Indeed, even as the presumption takes center stage, a debate still rages
over the intent requirement to aid, abet, or conspire under the law of
nations. The Second Circuit recently ratcheted up the evidentiary
requirement for the touch and concern test, but also sub silencio left the
door ajar for aiding and abetting claims based entirely on relevant aiding
and abetting conduct that occurs in the territorial bounds of the United
States. In Mastafa v. Chevron Corp.,379 the Second Circuit held that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over allegations that the U.S.-based oil
company enabled the government of Saddam Hussein by paying the regime
kickbacks that financed the torture and killing of innocent Iraqis.380 First,
the relevant conduct, namely “conduct [that] constitutes a violation of the
law of nations or aiding and abetting such a violation,” must touch and
concern the United States to displace the presumption of
extraterritoriality.381 Second, the court imposed a new requirement: the
court must “glimpse” the merits of the aiding and abetting allegation, going
beyond the Iqbal pleading standard “[w]here a complaint alleges domestic
conduct of the defendant” and dismiss the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction if it does not touch and concern the United States with
373. 782 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 2015).
374. Id. at 580–81.
375. Id. at 579–80.
376. Id. at 599.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 609 (“Accordingly, as reflected in our controlling precedent, the appropriate
standard for aiding and abetting liability is knowing substantial assistance.”).
379. 770 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014).
380. Id. at 174–76.
381. Id. at 186.
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sufficient force to displace the presumption.382 The panel also held that the
citizenship of the defendant did not matter—only whether the actions, in
this case the aiding and abetting, occurred in the United States.383 The
panel went on to hold that the conduct here—i.e., Chevron’s alleged
financing of the Hussein dictatorship and the recoupment of oil in its
stead—had occurred in the United States and therefore met the
extraterritoriality requirement.384 The relevant inquiry was whether the
conduct that touched and concerned the United States was the same conduct
that allegedly violated the law of nations, which can include aiding and
abetting.385 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the complaint in
Mastafa must be dismissed because Chevron did not possess the purpose to
aid and abet the human rights violations committed by the regime, only
knowledge of such violations.386
With regard to sovereign immunity and other doctrines used to dismiss
cases during this period, there were deviations from prior decisions.
Perhaps the one exception was the application of common law sovereign
immunity to two former Pakistani officials linked to a terrorist bombing in
Mumbai.387 There, a Second Circuit panel followed the executive’s
exhortations to grant immunity on the basis that a finding of liability would
jeopardize relationships in the region.388 Other dismissal doctrines did not
materially change from their previous contours, with the possible exception
of personal jurisdiction, which, pursuant to the 2014 decision Daimler AG
v. Bauman,389 required plaintiffs to have specific contacts to the forum state
if the claim relied on a foreign company’s subsidiary.390
CONCLUSION
Courts in the United States may be increasingly difficult places to pursue
human rights claims. Indeed, they may not be the best, or the least bad, fora
to litigate such suits given the lack of enforcement with respect to
judgments and the high dismissal rate. Yet all is not lost. The data show
that human rights suits are modest, but less so than believed. On the one
hand, it is true that suits against individuals produced almost no enforceable
judgments. On the other hand, suits against corporations have proven
lucrative. And the fact that the number of dismissals of these suits has
remained relatively static, hovering around 65 to 80 percent, suggests that
explanations of a growing hostility toward international law driving
dismissals are misplaced. At the very least, plaintiffs have the ability to
plead around them as they have mutated not only the types of claims they
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

Id.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 189–91.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 191–94.
Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 Fed. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 24.
134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, 2014 WL 1669873, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014).
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bring, but also the parties against which they bring them and the theories of
liability they rely on, such as the rise of cases alleging aiding and abetting.
It is true that the presumption of extraterritoriality has become the
dominant mode of disposing cases post-Kiobel II. The rise of the
presumption does evince a degree of isolationism—the idea that U.S. law
should not apply to govern the world. Though nominally the case is
premised on statutory interpretation and the legislative history of the ATS,
it is difficult to state with a straight face that this was the “reason” the Court
overturned the entire line of ATS jurisprudence since Filártiga and the
universal consensus that the ATS applied to cases involving actions
committed abroad by foreigners. More likely, the case was premised on the
increasing prominence of the ATS and a reluctance to use the ATS as
capaciously as it was previously deployed. Yet, Justice Breyer’s Kiobel II
concurrence combined with Justice Kennedy’s opinion suggests there is still
hope—and possibly a majority of the Justices—who believe that jus cogens
violations committed abroad can be litigated under the ATS if not through
other means.
Given the grounds under which ATS suits have been dismissed, a core
group of essential cases has emerged. These cases involve egregious
harms—typically harms like torture or extrajudicial killing—and they have
a connection to the United States, however slim. For example, in the
Marcos case, the family was exiled in Hawai’i.391 The defendant in
Filártiga was domiciled in Brooklyn when proceedings were initiated.392
This may be enough of a nexus to the United States to displace the
presumption.393 Unocal also would likely fall in this category—assuming it
could meet the aiding intent standard. As ATS doctrines have shifted and
witnessed the growth of suits against corporations—indeed the least modest
aspect of the ATS—plaintiffs’ attorneys may adapt and bring cases against
these types defendants just as plaintiffs’ attorneys adapted to changes in
ATS doctrines over the past five periods. There are not enough data postKiobel II to make a solid prediction as to whether such settlements will
continue, but the pushback by lower courts and evident sympathy toward
plaintiffs’ plights suggests it is premature to say that the ATS or TVPA are
dead. It is unlikely that these suits are a panacea to human rights
violations—but then again, they never have been.
The best hope lies in creative, factually rigorous pleading and careful
case selection. It may also lie in developing other transnational doctrines to
buttress against the presumption. For example, a recent collaborative effort
between human rights attorneys in Washington, D.C., and Nigerian lawyers
under another obscure federal statute, the Foreign Legal Assistance Act,394
391. See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 495
(9th Cir. 1992).
392. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878–80 (2d Cir. 1980).
393. This is not a viable argument, unfortunately, in the Second Circuit. Sikhs for Justice,
Inc. v. Nath, 596 Fed. App’x 7, 10 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that presence of Indian politicians
in the United States was insufficient to displace the presumption).
394. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2012).
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enabled plaintiffs who had suffered harm through Chevron’s gas flaring in
Nigeria to secure evidence of Chevron’s operations in the United States,
which they then provided to the Nigerian lawyers. The case—which likely
would not even have been actionable under the ATS—settled.395 Kiobel II
may indicate hostility at the Supreme Court level, but lower courts have
their doors open to these techniques, and the data speak to the fundamental
resilience of transnational human rights.

395. Rich Herz, Chevron Settles with Nigerian Villagers Seeking Information on Gas
Flaring Harms, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L (June 16, 2014), http://www.earthrights.org/media/
chevron-settles-nigerian-villagers-seeking-information-gas-flaring-harms [http://perma.cc/
2VEF-DPC7].

